Peace Through the Metaphor of War:
From Police Pacification to Governance Transformation in Rio de Janeiro

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ABSTRACT

The history of the military police in Rio de Janeiro is a history of violence. Police violence peaked during the democratic era when they have killed more civilians annually than the total disappeared during the military dictatorship. Their violence unduly targets the urban poor, those living in *favelas*, where poverty intersects with informality, where insecurity manifests in unprotected spaces, from inadequate infrastructure to lack of land title; from stigmatization as territories of criminality to violence as drug traffickers and militias battle each other, and the military police, for control. The pacification police are an attempt to reverse this history. The pacification police are the most prolific and contentious public security policy in Rio de Janeiro's recent history. Their official objective is to restore security to spaces once governed by armed criminals. But while pacifying the informal settlements they are also pacifying the military police. As the state on the streets, or its most visible aspect in the informal settlements, they are the locus of community concerns and interlocutors with public authorities. The pacification police are altering perceptions of the police in the eyes of residents and reforming what it means to be a law enforcement officer in the minds of police. They are unintentionally connecting a state that was distant from the informal settlements and complicit in the violence inside them to the urban poor. The pacification police are beginning to transform urban governance across Rio de Janeiro.

Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis

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My family often reminds me that I had a great aunt who astonished her West Texas family by moving to Rio de Janeiro where she lived for more than 50 years. My decade of researching and working in Brazil is not so surprising. In writing my thesis I often thought of my family, from my brother's encounter on Copacabana to my sister's reflections on the police to my parents who as international trailblazers opened the world to me from a young age after which I have never looked back.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

Introducing the Pacification Police

The history of the military police[1] in Rio de Janeiro is a history of violence (Van Reenen 2004, 38). From their founding almost 200 hundred years ago until the present day, policing has meant violence, primarily directed at the poor. Their militarization during the military dictatorship did not initiate their repression. In fact, police violence peaked after the transition to democracy, when armed criminals dominated the informal settlements, and the military police countered in militarized operations with masked faces and weapons of war. In recent years, they have killed, on average more than 1,000 people annually – totaling almost 10,000 deaths since 2003, equivalent to a homicide rate of 40 per 100,000 inhabitants, or one dead for every 23 they arrest (*Instituto de Segurança Pública*; Human Rights Watch 2009). The residents of the informal settlements where this violence is most concentrated told me that the military police made no distinction between them and the bandits, "The police only entered the community to kill…we were caught in the crossfire."[2]

Brazil is renowned for its stunning levels of violence. But with the eyes of the world on Rio de Janeiro with its economic resurgence, the discovery of offshore oil reserves and the mega-events of the Rio+20 Summit, the World Cup and the Olympics, there are myriad reasons to bring violence under control. The pacification police[3] (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*, UPP) are the most prominent public security policy in Rio de Janeiro in recent years. They operate in the most strategic (or symbolically important) informal settlements, most in the prosperous southern zone and on the road towards the Maracanã Stadium where the World Cup final will

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[1] Brazil preserves a distinction between the civil and military police. The former are responsible for criminal investigations; the latter with patrolling the streets. The military police are not part of the military, though they were subsumed under the military during their dictatorship from 1964 to 1985.

[2] Discussion with residents of Prazeres on May 31, 2011

[3] The UPP have been translated as pacification police, pacifying police, peace-making police, among others. The difficulty in translating the Portuguese word *pacificação*, literally pacification, to English is its strong connotations of militarized repression. I will not disentangle its meaning here, though I argue that these metaphors of war are reflective of the militarized history of the military police.

be played in 2014. While they are criticized for this fact, this is where they have the most visible impact and from where they could potentially percolate to the more than 1,000 informal settlements throughout the city, most beyond the gaze of the media, even the attention of the public authorities.

The very word pacification connotes both war and peace; war in the sense of repression, peace by means of submission. Through their occupation of spaces once governed by armed criminals, the pacification police aspire to bring peace through metaphors of war. The question is whether they can do so where the police are seen as one of the main actors of violence. Their first objective is territorial control, not ending the drug trade, rather removing its obvious signs from the streets where drug traffickers[4] once operated with impunity. After the elite squad of the military police, sometimes in conjunction with the military, occupies an informal settlement and displaces the traffickers, the pacification police operate on the basis of community policing, furthering their second objective of fostering peaceful connections between the residents of the informal settlements and the police.

The pacification police are portrayed as dominating the informal settlements and praised for integrating these long marginalized areas with the city. The reality is more complicated and in between, making it difficult to disentangle where public security ends and urban development begins in unprotected spaces such as informal settlements. The hillside slums of Rio de Janeiro are the iconic images of pervasive inequality (Leeds 1996, 58). State presence inside the informal settlements has long been selective, leaving them unprotected, their physical structures conducive to clandestine activity, making them ideal bases for entrepreneurs of violence – drug traffickers and militias – to conduct illicit activities. Their most recurrent interaction with the state has often been through militarized police incursions. Testimony from the residents of the informal settlements reveals a pervasive sense of fear, "our daily lives are ones of violence, physical violence, moral violence, violence in all senses"

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[4] Because there is only one UPP in a formerly militia-controlled area (Batam), my analysis focuses on the drug traffickers, though militias composed of off-duty security officials, including the military police, control about one-half of all the informal settlements in Rio de Janeiro (Centro de Justiça Global 2008).

(Machado da Silva 2008, 555). Similar words were echoed by many residents with whom I spoke.

Though institutionally tied to the military police, the pacification police are philosophically distinct. Their commander is a military police colonel; their officers are drawn from ranks of the military police; but their recruits are all new and they are trained in the precepts of community policing. The pacification police also have different uniforms than the military police, different pay scales and different ways of policing the informal settlements. There were 4,000 pacification police (out of 40,000 military police) working in twenty-two pacification police units as of May 2012. They began in December 2008[5] when the military police occupied the community of Santa Marta in the midst of friction between rival trafficking factions. The State Secretary of Public Security decided that more permanent police presence would be a better means of reducing violence than intermittent armed invasions. A month later another permanent police unit was installed in Cidade de Deus, which had already been occupied by the police for several months. It was only afterwards that the pacification police became Rio de Janeiro's official public security policy for the informal settlements.[6] In the words of the State Secretary of Public Security:

For decades our policy was to enter and leave the favelas, where there were three criminal factions fighting among themselves and with the police. Over decades we have trained a police to make war, not to provide services. Now instead of having warriors we have service providers (O Globo May 28, 2011).

Their official purpose is to return security to communities once controlled by armed criminals, but the unintended consequences of the pacification police go far beyond security. In fact, the outcomes in terms of security are the most studied but least controversial. As shown in the graph below, urban violence in Rio de Janeiro

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[5] The pacification police have support from across the political spectrum. The Governor and the Mayor are from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, PMDB), which has an alliance at the federal level with the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT). This permits the state military police to join forces with the municipality's urban upgrading programs and the federal government's Growth Acceleration Program (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento*, PAC)., making the pacification police a multi-layered, multi-dimensional policy that recognizes the police as essential for enhancing security but far from the only component.
[6] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011

has declined in the past decade; much more telling is the drop in police violence. In its deadliest year on record, the military police killed 902 people in 2007; only five years later there were 301 recorded police killings, high on a per capita basis but a dramatic decline of two-thirds nonetheless (*Instituto de Segurança Pública*). Without proving causality between the introduction of the pacification police in late 2008 and the reduction in police violence, the downward trend points to the possibility that something is working. In the first half of 2011, there were no homicides in eleven of thirteen communities where the pacification police were operating, and there was only one homicide in each of the other two areas (O Globo October 31, 2011). This is not to deny reports of increasing robbery and domestic violence in communities where the traffickers once imposed harsh punishments for these crimes, but the pacification police say that people are reporting these crimes more.[7] Nor does it deny the increase in violence on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro where the traffickers have probably fled, but residents of these neighborhoods have called for their own pacification police rather than ending the program.

Violence in the City of Rio de Janeiro
(data from *Instituto de Segurança Pública*)

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[7] Based on discussions at a community meeting in Escondidinho on May 17, 2011 and an interview with a pacification police captain on May 26, 2011.

But I am not interested in examining the security impacts of the pacification police. Instead, my thesis uncovers the evolving interactions between the residents of the informal settlements and the pacification police. The pacification police are deeply contentious. The residents praise and denounce the pacification police. They appreciate that armed traffickers no longer walk the streets but they are frustrated that weapons remain in the hands of the police. There is also skepticism within the pacification police, with some lamenting the lack of adrenaline that initially caused them to join the police, and others frustrated by ongoing tensions with residents. But the differences with the past are undeniable. In contrast to criticism that the pacification police are merely makeup as Rio de Janeiro prepares to host the World Cup and the Olympics, or speculation that violence has not declined but only moved its address, there are small signs that relations between the residents and the police are improving, or at least evolving. This is evident in community meetings bringing together the residents and the police, interactions unimaginable when the military police only entered these communities shooting, in search of traffickers, or looking for bribes. I portray perceptions of the pacification police in all their complexities because any other way would have taken one side or another when almost everyone that I spoke with agreed that the pacification police are very complicated.

I was surprised to learn that the most divisive part of the pacification police is their regulation over the *baile funk*, the dances once held by the traffickers, whose lyrics reflect the struggles of the *favelas* and sometimes glorify the kingpins. The pacification police initially banned the *baile funk*, but as this was too controversial, many now permit them until certain hours. Several residents compared this to an imposed social dictatorship, where once the traffickers controlled the community with their social order, now the pacification police impose their own. Yet the rules around the *baile funk* are changing, with some captains calling for the residents to vote on the hours they want to hold the dances, and others publicizing the *bailes* for a wider public as part of a broader strategy to integrate the informal settlements with the rest of the city. In the midst of controversy over the *baile funk*, the residents and the police are confronting each other peacefully in ways unthinkable before. There remains deep-seated wariness by the residents and deep-rooted militarism

by the police, but the pacification police are beginning to transform how the residents of the informal settlements and the police are interacting with each other.

Another surprise of the pacification police is the ways they are broadening the mandate of what it means to be a policeman in the informal settlements. The commander of the pacification police, Colonel Robson Rodrigues, said that he seeks "mutual transformation, humanizing the police's relations with the residents and humanizing the police themselves."[8] This means inculcating a different mindset, the idea "you can be a policemen by using dialogue instead of a gun."[9] The pacification police are less focused on fighting drug traffickers and more interested in building relationships with the community, especially with the children. The police are their soccer coaches, dance instructors and tutors. There is almost a universal fascination among the children for the police, especially their uniforms, and often when I talked with the captains, there were children playing with his hat. The pacification police work with the children because they are less opposed to the police, and they hope to translate this acceptance to the rest of their family.[10]

Many demands placed on the pacification police are beyond their mandate. Residents come to the police about unfulfilled promises, such as the pothole that the public works department said it was going to fix and never did, or the kindergarten whose roof collapsed and was never repaired. The police pave the way for service providers by enhancing security and making the informal settlements more visible and their infrastructure needs more pressing. The pacification police in attempting to resolve these demands are unintentionally reforming the military police. Several captains told me that they want to inculcate community policing back to the military police, especially as this has proven more effective in reducing violence than more militarized methods. There are already steps underway to reform the training of the military police, which the commander of the pacification police described to me as the formation of a "warrior ethos".[11] While they are meant to pacify communities

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[8] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011
[9] Ibid
[10] Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011
[11] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011

made violent by criminal actors, the pacification may also be a means of pacifying the military police.

The metaphors of war inherent to the training of the military police and their history in policing the informal settlements need to be untangled for security to be more than which armed actor governs but actually allows residents to improve their homes and enhance their livelihoods, of which physical security is an important pre-condition, but far from sufficient. The contribution of the pacification police is in undoing the metaphors of war that have made the military police unaccountable to those they are meant to be protecting. The question is whether the pacification police will transform the military police or whether the traditional militarism of the military police will contaminate the pacification police. Without denying that the pacification police have been tinged by the legacy of the military police and by their violent methods of policing the informal settlements, the hope is that they are not only pacifying the informal settlements but also, and more importantly, pacifying the military police.

The police have been termed *the state on the streets* (Hinton 2006); yet inside the informal settlements their presence has long been adversarial, distancing these unprotected spaces from the state despite their physical proximity in the city. The police are rarely conceived as a fundamental part of urban governance; more often than not they are tolerated, avoided and ignored. Yet the police perform one of the most essential societal roles in the provision of public security. Instead of seeing the police as a problem to be solved they are actually an aspect of governance that could be enhanced, as "fundamentally, a police officer represents the most visible aspect of the body politics and is that aspect most likely to intervene directly in the daily lives of citizenry. If one considers the President to be the head of the political system then the patrolman on the street must be considered the tail" (Van Maanen 1973, 1). As its everyday security representatives on the streets, the pacification police are connecting the state to its citizens.

My thesis explores how the pacification police are (possibly) transforming the understanding and experience of urban governance in the informal settlements where they are operating. Because the first pacification police unit was inaugurated

in December 2008, there is relatively little published beyond the Brazilian media where most of the focus is on security with very little on their broader possibilities for urban governance (except Machado da Silva 2010). One of the most interesting unintended consequences of the pacification police is their connecting the state and the urban poor. The pacification police are potentially part of a transition from a militarized force that saw security through the lens of war towards a method of policing more suited for a democratic era. Focusing on providing the security needed to urbanize and upgrade the informal settlements not only transforms the military police but also tackles the root of insecurity inside these communities – their poverty and inequality that have marginalized them from the rest of the city.

It is not that the military police will overnight be transformed from actors of violence into perfect community policemen. Instead, two words that often arose in my interviews were learning and prevention. The pacification police are a learning process, where they are learning by doing, developing successes and fixing mistakes. They are also an effort at community policing where the focus is crime prevention rather than only dealing with the consequences of crime. They are part of a reform process. It is too soon to make definitive conclusions, as the pacification police have only been operating for about four years, and some units for only a few months, but there are changes already underway. They are altering perceptions of the police in the eyes of the residents and reforming what it means to be an officer in the minds of the police. The result is possibly a transformation in urban governance, where with the pacification police as its security agents on the streets, the state is more present, more responsive and more legitimate inside the informal settlements.

Reflections on Methodology

The stories told and conclusions made in my thesis are based on four months of research in eleven pacification police units. I was in Rio de Janeiro from May to July 2011 and from December 2011 to January 2012. My main methodologies were participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Most of my interactions with residents were informal, the result of listening to their accounts at community

meetings and having spontaneous discussions on the side. Poverty and violence have long marginalized these areas where access is difficult and where there is a very definite line between those who are from inside the community and those who come from the outside. Although the permanent presence of the pacification police has enhanced security conditions, the history of territorial control by the traffickers as well as memories of police violence made it difficult to talk to residents directly about the pacification police; instead, most wanted to talk about the deficits of basic infrastructure and lack of social services. It was by hinting at the pacification police through these more pressing concerns that I understood that most residents do not see security solely as those who control their community, whether the traffickers in the past or the police in the present. Their understanding is broader. They hope that the pacification police will provide the security needed for more important investments in urbanizing and upgrading their communities.

There were also security reasons for why the residents are reluctant to talk about the pacification police. The pacification police are far from the first experience with community policing in several of communities. Past programs faltered due to police corruption as well as their failure to gain political traction and support within the military police. Many residents doubt the sustainability of the pacification police, fearing the traffickers' return and their retaliation against those who supported the police. Others see the pacification police through the same eyes as before, so despite their different name and distinct uniforms, the pacification police are identical to the violent actors that repressed them in the past. Yet, even those who were reluctant to discuss the pacification police ended up speaking about them indirectly by explaining why they did not want to talk.

My discussions with the pacification police were more direct, but because the military police remain a hierarchical institution, it is difficult to determine whether their responses represent their personal views or the official line. I often perceived a distinction between the officers (each unit is commanded by a captain, the highest ranking officer in the community) and the recruits (the lower-ranking policemen and women). Even the commander of the pacification police admits that the recruits receive insufficient training in community policing. While most recruits told me that

they wanted closer interactions with the residents, some missed the confrontation that inspired them to join the military police.

The military police are often reluctant to answer the questions of outsiders. I was privileged to have direct access to the pacification police through my internship with the municipality's urban development institute, the *Instituto Pereira Passos*. My internship was with the UPP Social, which is responsible for coordinating the communities' most important needs in terms of infrastructure and social services and working with the public authorities and the pacification police to resolve these unmet demands. Meeting the police on this basis, when I heard their perspective first in my role as a collaborator rather than as a critical researcher, facilitated my interviews later, as I had already established a rapport through my everyday visits, which I hope established the trust for more honest answers to my questions. This is not to deny that my connections to the pacification police could bias my research in other ways, especially as I was seen talking to both residents and police during my frequent visits to the communities, and there is ongoing distrust between them.

In the course of my fieldwork I interviewed ten officers in the pacification police, and I spoke with many more recruits while they were patrolling the streets. I also interviewed two community leaders, and I spoke with and listened to countless residents at community meetings. I also interviewed outsiders working inside the communities, from four bureaucrats in the city government to one academic who studies insecurity to four non-governmental representatives who experience these changes inside the informal settlements everyday. I maintain confidentiality for the residents as well as the pacification police except for their first commander, Colonel Robson Rodrigues. As all of the meetings I attended and the interviews I undertook were in Portuguese, and all of the quotations are my own translations, I try to keep as close to the literal meaning as possible without losing the meaning in English.

Thesis Structure

The following tells the relatively unexamined stories of the everyday interactions between the residents of the informal settlements and the pacification

police. ***Chapter One*** provides a background to urban governance inside the informal settlements, weaving together the narrative of state absence from these unprotected spaces with the recognition of state complicity with the violence within them. ***Chapter Two*** uncovers the history of intermittent attempts at public security policy and military police reform. ***Chapter Three*** traces the evolving interactions between the residents and the pacification police, not only examining the ongoing distrust but also uncovering the signs of transitions underway. ***Chapter Four*** emphasizes the often-overlooked perspective of the police, focusing on whether the pacification police are reforming the military police from within. In conclusion, ***Chapter Five*** explains how the pacification police are transforming urban governance across Rio de Janeiro.

CHAPTER 1: WHEN STATE ABSENCE BECOMES STATE COMPLICITY

This chapter has a twofold purpose. First, it summarizes the ideas of urban violence in unprotected spaces such as informal settlements. Second, it provides a brief background on urban governance in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro. Integrating the literature with the history, it describes how, in the absence of the state, non-state armed actors came to govern significant parts of the city, and how, through the complicity of the state, violence was perpetuated inside them. If the pacification police are to make the state more physically present, more responsive and more legitimate in the informal settlements, then it must first be shown how the state's presence has long been selective, the public authorities unaccountable and the military police illegitimate in the eyes of the residents. The chapter reveals how the history of state neglect made the violence of the traffickers so powerful and how the violence of the police came to define these communities' relationship with the state.

There are two explanations of violence in the informal settlements of Rio de Janeiro. Both focus on the role of the state in catalyzing and intensifying violence. The first asserts that the state has long been physically and symbolically absent (at least distant) from the informal settlements where violence has been concentrated. State absence made these spaces unprotected and permitted non-state armed actors to establish social order. In the words of a Brazilian public security expert:

> *The bandits' territorial control subtracts the zones of urban poverty from the state and creates an archipelago of independent areas, a form of clandestine feudal barony, nonetheless visible, that the rule of law cannot reach, where democratic institutions, the constitution, and the law do not operate* (Soares 2000, 269).

The second claims the state has been present in ways that deepen violence. Where once *donos do moro* (local leaders) established social order in the informal settlements, they were displaced by drug traffickers who meted out their own order through violence and reinforced their control by paying off the military police. The police reinforced the traffickers' territorial control by corruption as well as violence when illicit dealings turned sour. The state was complicit in perpetuating violence,

with the urban informal poor caught between the illegal violence of the traffickers and the official violence of the state. In the words of a Brazilian anthropologist:

The legal state has been absolutely disastrous, because (it functions) like an actor in the conflict with bandits, using the same weapons and ethics as the bandits, who are considered enemies. It engages in combat with them and, as a result, is transformed into an equal of the bandits (Kant de Lima as quoted in Arias 2006a, 3-4).

The presence of the military police inside the informal settlements is one of insecurity. As a resident once commented, "We're between a rock and a hard place. It ends up being a perverse reversal, whereby the absence of the state (in the form of the police) becomes beneficial" (Leeds 1996, 72). This suggests the paradox of the police – in outbreaks of violence one of the state's first actions is to deploy the police in the name of restoring order. The problem is that the police are complicit in much of the violence but integral to public security. The history of police violence in the informal settlements underlines the importance of demilitarizing the military police to provide security rather than perpetuate insecurity.

The State Inside the Informal Settlements

The official objective of the pacification police is to restore security in areas once controlled by armed criminals. But against the backdrop of violence, where drug traffickers and militias battle each other, and the police, for territorial control, where non-state armed actors destabilize the state's monopolization of the means of violence, and where the state perpetuates violence through the police as its armed security representatives, what is meant by security, and security for whom? Security and the ability to create it have long been viewed under the purview of the state. From Hobbes, who identified the provision of security as a basic function of the state; to Weber, who believed that secure state formation necessitated control over the means of coercion; to Tilly, who linked state formation with war making and the provision of protection, security has long been defined in terms of state formation, inter-state relations and political power (Goldstein 2010). Yet it has been difficult to apply the ideas behind state security to more recent contexts of urban insecurity.

Informal settlements are spaces where the distinctions between alternative social orders are blurred but the consequences of competing forms of governance are sharpened. The emergence of different orders in response to social inequities is documented from Sicilian mafias to North American gangs to guerrilla movements in the highlands of Peru to paramilitaries controlling city blocks in Medellín to drug traffickers dominating the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro (Leeds 1996, 68-70). Armed criminality flourishes where inaccessibility and administrative inefficiency are the norm, but it has been said that banditry, gang rivalry, policing and war making are on the same continuum towards state making, with the government an organized protection racket against competing social orders (Tilly 1985, 170). What from the outside are seen as ungoverned spaces are actually places where the state competes with non-state armed actors to assert its authority. This is the case of many informal settlements where violence converges in spaces where intermittent state presence contributes to the rise of entrepreneurs of violence that profit from illicit activities, such as the drug trade or the control over informal economies (Davis 2009, 222). Violence is not specific to informal areas but this is where it is most concentrated because these are unprotected spaces where the state's presence has been distant, forcing residents to turn to illicit actors to provide security. They are also unprotected from the violence of the state, most notably the police as its armed security representatives.

The literature tends to set informal spaces distinctly apart from the formal state, which is described as an outside force acting upon the community but almost never acted on by the community. The state is seen as distant from the urban informal poor who self-built their homes out of the material that was available, starting with cardboard and wood, and scaling up to bricks and concrete; the residents persevered for years under the constant threat of removal because they lacked title to their land, a fact that ensured they received no electricity, no water and sanitation and their access to education and healthcare was precarious at best, as the provision of urban services would have been tantamount to legalizing their illegality. But with the state depicted so abstractly, as a separate single entity set apart from the community, it is difficult to understand the many ways that the

public authorities influence, impose and interact with these communities. The state is not only a despotic actor that threatens the informal settlements with physical removal but also an infrastructural power with the capacity to penetrate civil society and enhance the conditions of its citizenry (Mann 1986, 114). Since Brazil's transition to democracy, when political competition provided incentives to increase the state's infrastructural presence in the informal settlements, there have been investments in urbanizing them. One was *Favela-Bairro*, the continent's largest urban upgrading project, that aimed to convert the slums (*favelas*) into neighborhoods (*bairros*) by extending electricity and water services, installing drainage and sanitation systems, paving alleyways and building public schools and health posts (IADB 1994). Yet the one service never provided was security. In sum, the state was not absent from the informal settlements, only present in different ways, generating distrust among the residents and compounding their distance from the state.

State Absence

With security seen as state control over the means of coercion, insecurity in the informal settlements builds on assumptions about the weakness of the Brazilian state. It has been argued that the insecurity prevailing throughout Latin American cities stems from the failure of public institutions. This fragility particularly afflicts impoverished informal areas resulting in the *brown areas* of democracy, where the presence of the state is very low or even absent, and where private powers reproduce authoritarian practices, resulting in a paradoxical disjunction where:

> *In many brown areas democratic, participatory rights are respected. But the liberal component of democracy is systematically violated. A situation in which one can vote freely and have one's vote counted fairly but cannot expect proper treatment from the police or the courts puts into serious question the liberal component of democracy and severely curtails citizenship"* (O'Donnell 1993, 1361).

This matches the impasse of Brazilian informal settlements, where with political liberalization they fear less their forcible removal by the state (though displacement

by market forces remains a fear), but with economic uncertainty they suffer ongoing inequalities in access to essential services, including public security. Citizenship is further diminished in *brown areas* governed by non-state armed actors, such as the drug traffickers and militias that control most of the informal settlements of Rio de Janeiro. Their territorial control subtracted the zones of urban informality from the purview of the state, with the informal settlements as the brown areas of Brazilian democracy, or unprotected spaces outside the governance of the state, or governed by non-state armed actors, intricately tied to the urbanization in Rio de Janeiro.

Before the rise of the drug traffickers, before even the violence of the police, the poverty of the informal settlements defined the basis of their insecurity. The first informal settlement (termed a *favela* after a local coarse and untamed plant) was constructed at the end of the 19th century on the *Morro da Providência* in central Rio de Janeiro (Meade 1997, 71). The *favelas* became synonymous with the self-constructed shacks climbing the hillsides, first in the central and southern zones, soon spreading along the transport corridors towards the northern and western peripheries. They materialized as the poor's only option for housing in the midst of rapid urbanization. Unable to find affordable land in the city, the poor innovated. They built their homes steep on the hillsides or far into the periphery, investing in upgrading on an artisanal scale, creating a distinct urban landscape in contrast to the planned streets and services of the formal city. Their houses are still precariously and densely packed and access is complicated by few paved roads, many narrow alleyways and broken stairs. Despite the struggle and success of residents in urbanizing their communities, the *favelas* are still synonymous with poverty, and in recent years with insecurity and violence.

Though physically intertwined with the formal city, the informal settlements have been exceedingly remote from the public authorities' planning considerations. They disrupted the carefully demarcated system of class privilege and undermined the striven for sense of order. According to early 20th century police reports, they were an "evil threatening the security of the entire community" (Pino 1996, 419). Mayor Pereira Passos' urban renovation and beautification plan marked the first *favelas* for removal around 1906. The *favelas* needed to be contained to ensure that

their pathologies (and poor residents) did not spill into the rest of the city (Meade 1997, 94). Defining a *favela* as a "disordered nuclei of impoverished persons", the public authorities counted 105 *favelas* housing 138,837 people living in 34,538 shacks in 1948 (Pino 1996, 431). The number of *favelas* multiplied in the midst of accelerating industrialization and urban migration during the 1950s to the 1970s.

The public authorities took a long time before formally acknowledging the informal settlements. The 1950 census, the first to incorporate the more than 100 *favelas* into the public records, defined them by what they lacked: (i) minimum proportions (more than fifty residences); (ii) type of habitation (predominance of rustic shacks); (iii) juridical condition (without title to the land); (iv) public services (absence of water and sanitation plumbing, electricity and telephone); and (v) urbanization (lack of paved streets), under the assumption that they would cease to tarnish the urban landscape if only they had more and better of everything (Pino 1996, 421). They persisted as aberrations on the modern city, with the government refusing to mark them on maps (where until the 1980s they were blank spaces[12]) and eradicating them. About 100,000 residents from 70 *favelas* were forcibly resettled to periphery in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the most repressive years of Brazil's military dictatorship (Arias 2006a, 25).

State policies towards the informal settlements were revised following the transition to democracy in 1985.[13] When the Inter-American Development Bank prepared *Favela-Bairro* in Rio de Janeiro during the early 1990s, they estimated that 65 percent of *favela* households were not connected to potable water, 75 percent were without adequate sanitation services and 67 percent had no garbage collection. Street paving and drainage networks were inadequate or non-existent. Almost 90 percent of families did not hold formal title to their land (IADB 1994). They have since benefited from public investment, with services such as piped water and electricity extended to almost all but the most peripheral communities.

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[12] Ricardo Henriques, President of the *Instituto Pereira Passos*, in Escondidinho on May 19, 2011
[13] The legal frameworks of the new urban order were enshrined in the 1988 Constitution and 2001 City Statute. The Constitution recognized the social right to housing and the right to regularization of consolidated informal settlements. The City Statute outlined the legal instruments to realize these goals and paved the way for urban upgrading programs throughout Brazil (Fernandes 2007).

But despite decades of physical removal and *in-situ* upgrading, the *favelas* remain marginalized on multiple levels – by their inadequate infrastructure and scarce social services; by their lack of legal land title; by their stigmatization as territories of criminality; and by their violence as drug traffickers battle each other, and the police, for territorial control. There are now more than one thousand *favelas* where some one and half million people reside in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro.

Population Living Rio de Janeiro Favelas (IBGE data)

Decade	City Population	% Growth Total City	*Favela* Population	% Growth *Favelas*	% *Favela*/ Total
1950	2.4 million	-	170,000	-	7%
1960	3.2 million	38%	335,000	98%	10%
1970	4.3 million	30%	565,000	69%	13%
1980	5.1 million	20%	722,000	28%	14%
1990	5.5 million	8%	883,000	22%	16%
2000	5.9 million	7%	1.1 million	24%	19%
2010	6.3 million	8%	1.4 million	27%	22%

Physically intermingled with the city, though existing almost apart on steep hillsides or far into the periphery, the informal settlements are enclaves of poverty with little public infrastructure or political representation. In the past, *donos do morro* (local strongmen) controlled these communities by lending services in times of suffering and protecting residents against threats of removal. They prohibited crimes such as robbery, rape and murder and accused criminals were tried before the *dono* who enacted extra-judicial punishments. They upheld their social order by violently enforcing their authority (Dowdney 2003, 45). They were also tied to local politicians in clientalistic agreements where the *donos* would guarantee political support in exchange for public investment in their community (Arias 2006b, 298).

The emergence of the drug trade altered these intersecting patterns of state absence and clientalistic control. There are three prominent drug trafficking factions in Rio de Janeiro – the *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command), the *Terceiro Comando* (Third Command) and the *Amigos dos Amigos* (Friends of Friends). The roots of the oldest, the *Comando Vermelho*, go back to the prison system during the dictatorship. Political prisoners were incarcerated with common criminals, with the former passing their organizational structure and collective ideology onto the latter. What

was imparted was diffuse and enduring – the criminals saw what could be achieved if they united in mutual assistance and forged a common identity around a set of rules to which all were beholden (Leeds 1996, 54). The *Comando Vermelho* took these rules with them when they returned to the *favelas* where many were from. With the rise of the international cocaine market during the 1980s, they moved into drugs in a more systematic fashion and soon they controlled the trade in most of the informal settlements (Penglase 2008, 125-129).

  The informal settlements, with their precarious hillside locations, densely haphazard layouts, labyrinthine streets separating them from the city below, were spaces where state presence had long been tenuous. They became the *boca de fumo* (mouth of smoke) for the cocaine trade. Their inaccessible geography, on unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides, made them ideal bases for drug traffickers who could defend themselves against rivals and elude police capture. In these virtually impenetrable spaces, the traffickers replaced the *lei do morro* (law of the hill) with the *lei do tráfico* (law of the traffickers). Their territorial control permitted them to displace weak (or virtually non-existent) state institutions, divide hillsides among factions, embed themselves to protect their business in return for internal security and often a range of services, such as arbitrating disputes and providing social assistance. In return for maintaining order and providing minimal social support, they demanded a base from which to run their business and a vow of silence against the police. As a resident recalled, "Your head was to think, your ears were to listen, but your mouth was not to talk."[14]

  Their authority was based on violence, but in return the traffickers offered protection. According to one of the founders of the *Comando Vermelho*:

> *Organized crime occupies the space that the system, the government, ignores in the area of social assistance. It's the bosses of the drug trade who buy school supplies for the children of favela residents, who pay for medicine and even for funerals. When a poor person needs a larger favor, he sends a message to a comrade in prison. From there come the orders to fulfill the request. Even hospital beds are arranged. Sometimes a woman in a favela doesn't have enough money to buy a butane gas tank to cook for her kids. She goes to the boca de fumo and the trafficker*

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[14] Interview with a resident of Providência from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH

gives her gas. We gain a lot when we help people. That's why poor communities protect drug traffickers. It's a question of survival (Penglase 2008, 131).

It was a system of reciprocity, uneven and coerced, where silence was earned both in the small ways that they provided social assistance and by threats of force. Local leaders who openly opposed this order were threatened, expelled, even murdered. As a resident remembered, "the trafficker was our brother, our friend, our relative, our enemy."[15] This was echoed by a community leader who recalled, "the traffickers became a parallel power, they were the power, they set the rules, but we were never citizens for them. For the traffickers we were always subordinate."[16] The residents were forbidden to cooperate with the police, but because of police repression this was what residents were unlikely to do. As one resident recounted, "Why do we always talk about the police? Because we know that the traffickers are violent. They are bandits on the edge of the law. What can we expect from them? We don't like the traffickers, but we cannot trust the police."[17]

State Complicity

The interpretation of state complicity sees the state as very present in the informal settlements, but in different ways than in the formal city. Police violence is a case in point. In their repression of the traffickers (or their collusion with them) the military police gave them legitimacy by making the violence of the state almost indistinguishable from that of the traffickers. The ideas that "the police are worse than the bandits" and "it isn't that we like the bandits but we can't trust the police" were voiced by many residents with whom I spoke. The history of the military police reveals its complicity in perpetuating violence in the informal settlements.

The military police were founded almost 200 years ago in the capital of newly independent Brazil, when more than half of Rio de Janeiro's population was enslaved, and the military police were charged with restraining slave resistance and reinforcing social separations (Holloway 1993, 39). It was thought that a militarized

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[15] Discussion with resident of Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on June 7, 2011
[16] Interview with community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
[17] Interview with community leader in Prazeres on May 31, 2011

police would be more disciplined in controlling an urban population perceived as disorderly and dangerous (Caldeira 2000, 146). In the words of a military police colonel, "The police are part of Brazil's colonial inheritance. They were constructed apart from the population because if they were too close then this would threaten the power of the state."[18] Police violence has been documented from independence to the present, from liberal to conservative governments, dictatorship to democracy, the police found ways of legalizing repression and enacting extralegal activities without punishment. The repression of criminality targeted the working classes, as "what the elite once called the *social question* has always been a *matter of the police*" (Caldeira 2000, 139). The consequence is that the poor have continuously suffered various forms of police violence and have learned to distrust the police. The modern police continue to perpetuate these disparities by maintaining hierarchical relations and enforcing security measures preserving these distinctions.

The military police are also a legacy of the military regime (1964 to 1985) when they were institutionally subsumed under the armed forces in the name of protecting internal security and repressing dissent. The dictatorship suspended constitutional guarantees of *habeas corpus*, canceled the mandates of congressional representatives and mayors, purged leftist leaders and censored the press. Instead of maintaining public security on the streets, the military police were charged with upholding national security, broadening the repressive means at their disposal to deal forcibly with the regime's opponents, both real and imagined (Hinton 2006, 94). Controlling unrest was the justification for repressing the civilian population of all classes. There remain blurred distinctions between the military and the military police, with the military police organized on military lines, trained in military instruction and subject to military justice.

The military dictatorship sowed seeds of violence, not only by fusing criminal elements with political opponents in inadvertently creating the *Comando Vermelho* but also by reinforcing police violence in assigning a military role to a civilian police

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[18] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011

force (Leeds 1996, 64). Nowhere is this truer than inside the informal settlements. From its earliest days, the military police have been described as fighting a war, but:

> *Unlike warfare against an external enemy on the battlefield…the objective was not to exterminate or eliminate the adversary. The goal was repression and subjugation and the maintenance of an acceptable level of order and calm, enabling the city to function in the interests of the class that made the rules and created the police to enforce them* (Holloway 1993, 37).

To this day when the military police climb the hillsides of the informal settlements it is most often with the mentality and tactics of an occupying army. They approach in tanks known locally as *caveirão*, or big skull, with rotating turrets turning 360 degrees and firing positions alongside the body. The flag of the elite squad of the military police, which they raise at the top to symbolize the community's recapture from the traffickers, depicts a skull impaled on a sword backed by two pistols – the skull symbolizing death, the sword signifying combat weapons that when pointed downwards through the skull indicate war, the black background meaning mourning and the pistols the insignia of the military police (Hinton 2009, 218).

      Police violence is also fueled by corruption, with the police often entering the informal settlements not to combat the drug trade but to share in its spoils. A former chief of civil police went so far to say that, "nothing is trafficked in this city without the collusion of the police" (Human Rights Watch 1996). Many operations are not to capture (or kill) the traffickers, or undermine their territorial control, but to enact revenge against factions that do not meet their extortion demands. In return for not interfering in the drug trade, the police demand payoffs from the traffickers who in turn budget the funds needed to pay off the police. This coexistence breaks down when the police think that they do not receive their fair share. Since the traffickers' leadership is diffuse and evolving, the police negotiate with multiple factions rather than one organization, with the nature and price of these arrangements different from one place to another. What the police are selling is protection, their bargaining conducted by violence, or at least the threat of it, as they need to prove how much their cooperation is worth by pressuring the traffickers (Penglase 2008, 136-137). The standoff between the military police and the traffickers is unstable, conflictive

and constantly subject to renegotiation, in vicious cycles of retaliation and counter-retaliation deepening levels of violence.

It should be noted that the preponderance of police violence and corruption is also a consequence of its poor training, poor equipment and poor salaries. The Rio de Janeiro police are among the lowest paid in the country, which forces many to supplement their incomes by working second jobs, often as private security guards, or even paramilitary forces known as the militias (Hinton 2006, 113; Huggins 2000, 118). Moreover, their operations inside the informal settlements are also deadly for the police. As a captain in the pacification police remembered, "we entered a *favela* without knowing who lived there; we looked at everybody as though they could be connected to the traffickers."[19] The feeling of being targeted from rooftops and behind staircases by traffickers as young as children created a sensation that led to one immediate reaction, "shooting your weapons everywhere because you feel like you are constantly under attack."[20]

Another aspect of state violence is vigilantism, often enacted by off-duty security officials who take the security of their communities into their own hands. These are the militias who have displaced the traffickers from most of the western zone of Rio de Janeiro. But in violently enforcing their authority, they act much like the traffickers they replace. The main difference is that they finance themselves by monopolizing informal services, such as transport, cable television and cooking gas, and charging protection fees to local businesses, rather than by selling drugs (though they may be moving into this more lucrative business). But what are most controversial about the militias are their alleged connections to local politicians, as the state turned a blind eye to their emergence once the militias were combating the traffickers (Centro de Justiça Global 2008, 48).

It is difficult to disentangle where state absence ends and state complicity begins inside the informal settlements. The traffickers consolidated their territorial control over the informal settlements because this was where the state was distant. Yet state absence could be interpreted as state complicity because politicians and

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[19] Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone conducted on July 1, 2011
[20] Ibid

policemen are tied to the traffickers in clientalistic relationships (Arias 2006c). Police corruption is understood as state complicity in deepening insecurity in the informal settlements. Yet state complicity could also be interpreted as state absence because if the police were more fully present inside the informal settlements, then the traffickers and militias would exert less control over these spaces and violence would no longer characterize their connections with the state. The absence of the state from the informal settlements as well as its complicity with the violence within them means that the urban poor have only been indirectly under the governance of the city authorities throughout most of their history.

Inside these unprotected spaces the state reproduces violence, both overtly through the military police as its armed security representatives and covertly with its complicity in the violence of others. Entrepreneurs of violence seek material gain rather than political control, but in controlling significant parts of the city they blur distinctions between economic and political violence, even expose the fragility of the national state. In their imposed social order on the informal settlements, the traffickers and the militias have come to take on the functions of the state at a much smaller scale by monopolizing the means of coercion and providing the community with protection in exchange for control over territory. The lucrative sums of money involved in the drug trade (and in extortion in the case of the militias) permit them to challenge state control in significant portions of the city and infiltrate the state agencies charged with coercion, namely the police, thus further limiting its capacity to reduce violence. State responses to insecurity are complicated by the fact that those charged with keeping order are also implicated in insecurity.

CHAPTER 2: Policing the Informal Settlements

In addition to well-known accounts of military police violence, there are less-examined narratives of police reform. Usually these efforts have been brushed aside as failures, because they were small-scale, they were soon discontinued and they did little to halt escalating police violence. But despite ongoing police violence there are also undercurrents for reform from inside the state secretary for public security and within the military police. Before discarding these past attempts at police reform as failures there are often new lessons to be learned from old projects.

This chapter sets out to uncover the hidden successes in the midst of all the pessimism about intractable police violence and impossible police reform. It builds on Tendler's analysis of governance innovation in perennially corrupt northeastern Brazil where she uncovers several surprising success stories. "Discovering these banished histories is not difficult," she writes, "and is particularly important because it will uncover important lessons of the story." This is especially so when analyzing a current program as it "may represent significant improvements over its antecedents – lessons that also need to be learned" (Tendler 1998, 3). There are many lessons the pacification police are incorporating from the past that in turn are informing their actions in the present. Instead of viewing these past programs as distinct from the current one, it is important to distinguish small successes as well as lessons that lie buried in a program's past.

This chapter traces the intermittent history of police reform in Rio de Janeiro. Although portrayed as innovative, the pacification police are actually based on past attempts at police reform. These past programs recognized police repression as incompatible with providing public security, not to mention irreconcilable with the democratic era. To demilitarize their approach to policing the informal settlements, reform-minded police officers and public security officials turned to community policing to prevent crime and reduce police violence. It is tempting to think of these past programs as unsuccessful because of the deepening of police violence (at least until very recently), but this overlooks new lessons that could be learned from old

projects, including: (i) the perception of the police in the eyes of the community (to gain their trust); (ii) the avoidance of territorial coexistence between the traffickers and the police (to avoid corruption); and (iii) the need to move beyond charismatic leadership to convince the military police as well as public security policymakers of the efficacy of less repressive policing (to ensure sustainability). The actions and the discourse of the pacification police are framed by lessons from the past, but to become part of a broader transformation in how the state is present in the informal settlements they need to break with the reoccurring failures that undermined past programs of police reform.

Public Security Reform and Reversal

Of the many institutional transformations since the democratic transition, the one institution that has not democratized is the security apparatus (Leeds 2007, 22). While legal norms have been overturned, norms of unaccountability have not, with laws of exception issued to accommodate police oversteps or conceal them from outside scrutiny and shifting legal boundaries framing police powers blurring tenuous distinctions between the legal use of force and illegal repression (Caldeira and Holston 1999, 700).

In contrast, community policing builds partnerships between the police and citizens and prevents crime by tackling its causes rather than only confronting its consequences. Colonel Nazareth Cerqueira, the commander of the military police in Rio de Janeiro from 1983 to 1987 and 1991 to 1994 (the first policeman rather than army officer to hold this position) brought these ideas to Brazil. Contemplating the role of the military police in the democratic era, he sought an alternative to police repression because it was ineffective in reducing violence and incompatible with democracy. Police reform meant transforming the military police not only within the institution but also in the minds of citizens. Envisioning a different policing for a more democratic Brazil, he wrote:

I did not doubt that the police guidelines and the democratic context demanded a new policy, a new police and a new conception of public order that went beyond the

previously adopted doctrine of national security. I was certain there was the need to formulate a new Brazilian police, believing that the democratic moment was an important opportunity for such a venture (Cerqueira 2001, 19).

He finishes with remorse, "Oh, how I was wrong!" Public security policy under his leadership and beyond followed a disjointed implementation, with the trend towards deepening militarization, punctured only briefly by moments of reform.

Colonel Cerqueira brought the ideas of community policing[21] to Brazil from what he learned in North America. Community policing is a preventive approach to security where society is the first defense against crime. It attempts to foster trust with the police and address the origins of criminality. It is based on three pillars: (i) community partnerships, to build collaboration with the police; (ii) problem solving, to engage in proactive policing; and (iii) organizational transformation, to inculcate these ideas within the police (Community Oriented Policing Services, United States Department of Justice). Outwardly focused on reducing crime by preventing crime, community policing also focuses on police reform. Reconstructing relationships with communities to gain their trust, reorienting indicators away from statistics of crime to measures of prevention and retraining officers to enhance their connections with the community are all components of community policing.

Leonel Brizola, the first democratically elected Governor of Rio de Janeiro (1983 to 1987 and 1991 to 1994) took immediate steps to dismantle the repressive apparatus of the military dictatorship. Part of his platform was police reform. As his appointed chief of military police, Colonel Cerqueira was determined to improve the police's human rights record by humanizing its actions in the informal settlements:

Policing is not about confrontation but conflict resolution. The democratic era demands a different definition of the police that no longer prioritizes combat as part of a philosophy of war that has long marked police repression. It is necessary to replace this mistaken idea of the police with one that prioritizes human rights. It

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[21] It is important to note that many initiatives termed *community* policing are not generated at the community level, nor do they involve community participation. Instead, community-*oriented* policing describes policing programs generated from above, but oriented toward concerns from below. This is a useful distinction to make with the pacification police, which while not executed with community consultation, certainly include community outreach (Arias and Ungar 2009, 409).

is necessary to clarify that we are not soldiers and that there is no enemy to combat but crime to prevent (Cerqueira 2001, 24).

Brizola's public security model was based on ending police impunity. He banned the military police from undertaking *blitzs*, or roadblocks accompanied by on-the-spot searches in the informal settlements. His order preventing the police from "kicking down the doors of shacks" and "arresting and searching suspicious people without judicial authorization" was popular among residents, but panic spread everywhere else it was said that restraints on the police tied their hands and stimulated the drug trade. Those opposed to reforming the military police claimed that the traffickers were exploiting the intense public discord to consolidate their territorial control (Hinton 2006, 130).

   Policing the informal settlements turned increasingly repressive. There was little support for police reform when homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro rose from 23 per 100,000 people in the early 1980s to 74 per 100,000 people by the mid-1990s (*Instituto de Segurança Pública*). There was temporary (and illusionary) security when the federal armed forces were called upon to patrol the streets and occupy the informal settlements (as happened during the United Nations Earth Summit in 1992 and Operation Rio two years later), but this overlooked deep problems of police violence. Two well-publicized cases from 1993 were the massacre of eight children sleeping outside the Candelária Church and 21 residents of Vigário Geral, both by police vigilantes (Leeds 1996, 65).

   There were still glimmers of reform inside the military police but these were momentary and shortly reversed. One was an experiment with community policing in the wealthy neighborhood of Copacabana, which took place over a period of less than one year from 1994 to 1995. The program brought together 60 recent graduates of the military police academy. Their training went beyond patrolling the community on foot to having the freedom to organize their routine based on interacting with the residents. The objective of community policing was to come to know the community's security concerns and become co-authors of their solutions through prevention rather than repression. The police attempted to deepen their

knowledge by placing urns around the community where residents could write down their security concerns. The police also attempted to foster partnerships with the community through local security councils. In practice, the program operated under difficult conditions. It was isolated within the military police and it failed to gain traction with the community; only two security councils were held and very few written comments were placed in the urns. Police indicators were based on criminal apprehensions not crime prevention, thus community policing failed to meet demands for immediate and spectacular results. After less than one year, the project was discontinued, falling at the side of the increasingly hard-line public security debate (Musumeci et. al. 1996).

Governor Alencar (1995 to 1998) reflected the reversal from police reform towards repressing criminality. His State Secretary for Public Security underlined the administration's policy when he said, "the police, not the criminal, needs to fire the first shot and ask questions later" (Hinton 2006, 133). He reinstated the *blitz* operations in the informal settlements and reintroduced an obscure policy from the military dictatorship where the police received bravery promotions for the number of criminals they confronted, even killed. An officer revealed where criminals were found, "You have to make their life hell so they don't come down from the hills…I didn't allow the bandit (*marginal da lei*) to leave the hills for the asphalt. I corralled him so that he could not go out" (Hinton 2006, 133). Although the police argued that this was effective in more directly confronting the traffickers rather than permitting them to hide in the hillsides, there was a six-fold increase in the number of civilians killed by the military police during this time (Human Rights Watch 1997). Further investigation into extrajudicial police brutality analyzed the facts contained (and omitted) in police and coronel reports to prove, with a preponderance of evidence, that the military police systematically employed unnecessary lethal force, destroyed homicide scenes, archived cases of police on civilian violence, even those with evidence of summary execution, and misreported executions as justifiable acts of self-defense, those classified as *auto de resistência* (Cano 1997).

The administration of Governor Garotinho (1999-2001) and his appointment of Luiz Eduardo Soares to the State Secretary for Public Security was yet another

turnaround. Soares simultaneously sought to increase the crime-fighting capabilities of the police while inculcating a respect for human rights. Believing that changes in public security began with changing the police, he wrote:

Extra-judicial combat sought to eliminate crime by executing offenders. The result was disastrous and paradoxical: a police force involved in criminality and powerless against its own crime. The military police are organized on principals of war. It employs force based on blind obedience, speed in execution, vertical hierarchy and lack of autonomy. With the exception of combat situations, the military police were not designed for public security whose complex challenges require exactly the opposite: flexible and decentralized decision-making, agility and adaptive oversight. Only then will it be possible to apply modern methods, such as policing oriented towards the resolution of problems or community policing (Soares 2009).

Soares set out to raise the standards for the police through improved training and salaries as well as increased collaboration with communities in tackling insecurity. His reforms included refurbishing civil police stations from centers of intimidation into places of professional interrogation, designating Integrated Public Security Zones to incentivize collaboration between military police battalions and civil police precincts, establishing Community Security Councils to raise citizens security concerns and redesigning training programs, including one where officers enrolled in university courses in history, politics, justice, citizenship and human rights. There was a 40 percent reduction in the number of police killings in his first year on the job, as well as a reduction in the number of police killed and a record number of weapons seized (Hinton 2006, 136-142).

One significant change was the establishment of an ombudsman to receive and monitor complaints about police abuses. Although unable to investigate these charges, the ombudsman was part of a process of police reform. It received 1,586 complaints in its first nine months of operation in 1999, including accusations of torture, extortion and excessive use of force; there were indictments in 20 percent of cases; convictions handed down in 7 percent; no policeman was jailed or expelled; and it was the ombudsman that turned into Soares' undoing (Caldeira and Holston 1999, 707). The Governor fired Soares on live television after he accused the police of intransience for not looking into the documented abuses (Hinton 2006,

143). In its first ten years, the ombudsman recorded 7,800 complaints against the police; yet of the only 42 criminal charges brought by state prosecutors only 4 resulted in convictions (Human Rights Watch 2009). The failure of the ombudsman points to the distressing lack of accountability within the military police despite the escalating statistics of police violence.

Experiments in Community Policing

Against the backdrop of police violence, there was also a consistent but small group of reform-minded public security specialists and police officers committed to reform. These individuals attempted several community policing initiatives in the informal settlements that were under-resourced, undermined by policy reversals and unsupported by many inside the military police, but because they foreshadow the pacification police in their attempt to reform policing in the informal settlements they offer important lessons.

Their hillside locations, narrow alleyways inhibiting vehicle access and high density behind a maze of staircases complicate policing in the informal settlements. The first attempts at patrolling the informal settlements began with posts known as Ostensive Police Detachments (*Destacamento do Policiamento Ostensivo*). They only existed in a small number of communities and most often they were composed of four police. The outnumbered police stayed inside small armored booths separating them from heavily armed traffickers. For their own protection they often ended up colluding with the traffickers (Dowdney 2003, 66). Community Policing Posts (*Posto de Policiamento Comunitário*) were meant to engage with the community by offering social services, but again problems arose when the police avoided confrontation with the traffickers most often by cooperating with them (Mattar et. al. 2010, 76). Corruption meant that experiments in community policing were seen as failures; yet there were also hints of isolated successes, most notably the decline in violence when there was a more permanent police presence. These small-scale initiatives laid the foundations for more far-reaching community policing programs.

The Police Grouping in Special Areas (*Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais*, GPAE) was an unprecedented community-policing program that sought to restructure the policing of the informal settlements by building better relations with the residents and permanently stationing the police inside the community. It began in 2000 in the community of Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho after residents took to the streets to protest the killing of five of their neighbors whom the military police accused of being traffickers. Under the leadership of Colonel Carballo, the number of homicides was reduced to zero in its first two years (Arias and Ungar 2009, 418). Carballo did not have the resources to remove the traffickers from the community; rather he prohibited (i) the circulation of firearms; (ii) the involvement of children in criminality; and (iii) the abuse of power by the police (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 42). His objective was the reduction of violence, not the end of the drug trade.

Inside the informal settlements, the GPAE struggled to gain the confidence of the residents, and within the military police he confronted skepticism of community policing. Carballo promised to investigate accusations of police abuse. He personally handed out pamphlets with his phone number so that residents could contact him at anytime (Arias 2004, 23). The police also received requests for medical assistance and employment; their stations were seen as places to complain about the problems of public services; and the residents even called upon the police to provide physical education and tutoring for the children (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 42). Yet there were tensions over the *baile funk*, which were never banned, but the GPAE imposed rules on how late they could occur and how loud the music could play (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 43). There were also tensions within the police. Their patrols of the informal settlements were more physically demanding than stationary posts in the city. There was the feeling that reaching out to the residents did not constitute real police work. Playing on the Portuguese word for mother (*mãe*), the GPAE were scorned as GMÃE.[22] The GPAE were given the most truculent officers as a purposeful strategy to thwart its success, and in its first year 70 percent were transferred due to abuses against the residents and corruption with the traffickers (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 43).

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[22] Interview with Silvia Ramos, the coordinator of the Center for Studies on Public Security and Citizenship, at University Candido Mendes on July 11, 2011

The GPAE's initial success in reducing violence was corrupted because the police failed to territorially dislodge the traffickers. Police presence restricted their movement, as the traffickers could no longer walk through the community armed, but they carried out their trade almost unhindered on the other side of the hill. As a resident recalled, "If the police were on one side of the hill, the bandits were on the other. We didn't cross this divide. The effects were small, changes in command, but the corruption was evident."[23] Restricting their patrols to areas around the station, the police symbolically indicated which points were the 'territory of the police', thus the other spaces were re-appropriated as 'territory of the traffickers'. An officer in the pacification police currently working in Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho recalled how the police relinquished control to the traffickers:

> *In the beginning, the GPAE was like the UPP, but it lacked investment and institutional support. The GPAE had no power, which meant that the area of the police soon became the area of the traffickers, showing the community that the police were powerless; they co-existed with the traffickers. The traffickers had an arsenal of war and the police were hostages of the criminals.*[24]

Police toleration of the drug trade meant that residents distrusted those meant to provide security. They said the only difference between the time of the traffickers and the time of the GPAE was the end of the shootings (Albernaz et. al. 2007, 44).

Lessons Learned in Community Policing

The parallels between the GPAE and the pacification police are striking.[25] In the community of Cantagalo-Pavão/Pavãozinho, violence declined dramatically after the GPAE was implemented only one decade before violence yet again plummeted with the pacification police. This is a difficult legacy to overcome for the pacification police currently stationed in the community. Everyday they must prove that they will not be corrupted by the traffickers, nor will they leave the community as the

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[23] Interview with a resident of Cantagalo-Pavão/Pavãozinho on July 12, 2011
[24] Interview with an UPP officer in Cantagalo-Pavão/Pavãozinho on July 12, 2011
[25] Of the six communities where the GPAE once operated, the pacification police are now patrolling in five: Cantagalo-Pavão/Pavãozinho, Formiga, Vila Cruzeiro (Complexo da Penha) and Casa Branca and Characa do Ceu (Borel)

GPAE did after only a few years. This is one of the reasons that the captain has built a six-storey police station on the main road of the community. He is attempting to project a perception of permanence in order to separate the pacification police from the GPAE. Yet this is not to overlook the myriad differences between them, as noted by a professor of public security in Rio de Janeiro:

The UPP is not an unprecedented experiment because Rio de Janeiro had similar experiments in the past, like the GPAE, the community policing in Copacabana, but this is the first time that the state is investing heavily in the program, and it is the first time that the state says this is the model to follow. In the past, these experiments were literally experiments, and the police thought that they were strange things, not real policing, only something on the side, but now the idea is that this will become normal policing in poor communities in the future. Whether this will be so or not is still in the cards.[26]

If the metric of success is a *sustained* reduction in violence then experiments with community policing failed. The more permanent and peaceful presence of the police in the informal settlements was in actuality only intermittent and complicit with the traffickers. Despite reduced violence in Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, this photogenic community with its panoramic views is often the site of pilot projects because what happens on the hillsides reverberates in the wealthy neighborhoods below. There were significant problems with police corruption in Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, thus expanding the GPAE to hundreds of other communities, most beyond the gaze of the media and the interest of civil society, would have required a level of political continuity and police commitment that, as this chapter has shown, would have been difficult to attain. When controversies over police violence passed, and the determination to reform the military police faded, the traffickers once again regained their territorial foothold in the informal settlements.

One of the main lessons learned from past community policing projects was that leadership was important, from policymakers at the top who sought broad reforms to police officers who brought innovation on the ground. When there was disruption, including a change in political administration, or a dismissal of a reform-

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[26] Ignacio Cano interviewed by RioRadar on August 29, 2011. Available at:
http://rioradar.com/tag/ignacio-cano

minded police officer, the tendency was for leadership to shift back to those that had prevailed in the past, the hard-line policymakers who favored violent incursions, the military police who saw themselves as soldiers and the traffickers who dominated the informal settlements. Yet there are several other lessons from the history of police reform in Rio de Janeiro: (i) the deep-seated mutual mistrusts, not only the residents' suspicion of the police but also the wariness of the police towards reform; (ii) the corruption of the police when they are in close proximity to the traffickers; and (iii) the often disorienting lack commitment on the part of policymakers. It seems that for police reform to succeed that there need to be alignments across the political spectrum, an end to territorial coexistence between the police and the traffickers and efforts to ameliorate distrust between residents and police. There also need to be efforts to convince the military police of the efficacy of community policing. When these obstacles were overcome – even momentarily – there was a reduction in violence, and a step towards enhancing security in the informal settlements. Reforming an institution such as the military police is not something that lends itself to quick fixes. This is especially true in Rio de Janeiro where the military police are one of the main actors of violence.

CHAPTER 3: Evolving Perceptions of (In)security

The contradiction of police violence is that while the police are at the core of the problem they are also integral to its resolution. The pacification police typify this paradox. While charged with bringing security to the informal settlements, the police are often the source of insecurity, at least in the eyes of the residents. The pacification police are an attempt to redefine how security is experienced in the informal settlements. This chapter summarizes my main impressions of the pacification police based on the many community meetings I attended, discussions with residents on the side of these meetings, interviews of police officers and personal impressions from noticing how the residents and the police interacted with (or avoided) each other.[27]

Perceptions of the pacification police are in a state of transition. None of the residents called for the end of the pacification police, but many remain wary. They appreciate the opportunities for their children, but they wonder about the adolescents who are the most resistant to the police. They say that they can come and go without the fear of violence breaking out between the traffickers and the police, but they fear ongoing police repression from searching their homes and belongings. Some compare the militarization of their community under the pacification police to their domination by the traffickers:

> *Nobody liked the shootings, but we left the judgment of the traffickers for that of the police. There are still heavy weapons; the only difference is that the gun is no longer in the hands of the trafficker but the police. What kind of peace is this?*[28]

The police are sensitive to their suspicions, as one policewoman told me:

> *It wasn't very long ago that the police were putting guns in people's faces and now they are all about good morning, good afternoon. This transition will take time.*[29]

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[27] My fieldwork covered 11 pacification police units (Andaraí, Babilônia-Chapéu/Mangueira, Borel, Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho, Cidade de Deus, Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa, Prazeres-Escondidinho, Providência, São Carlos, Tabajaras/Cabritos and Turano

[28] Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011

[29] Discussion with a UPP recruit in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on July 1, 2011

This chapter will reveal how this transition is already underway.

Changing Perceptions of the Police

Among the many residents with whom I spoke, there is very little debate that security, at least defined by the reduction of violence, has improved following the arrival of the pacification police. The following quotations illustrate a consensus on the most positive aspects of the pacification police:

The end of the shootings, between rival traffickers or from police invasions, means that there is a sense of calm and tranquility: "*Today we no longer fear police incursions because we are with a police that are doing their part day by day. We are still in the process of adaptation, but there is no doubt that with the pacification police we now have what we never had before, and that is peace.*"[30]

The end of the armed traffickers on the street means that the residents are no longer as threatened by weapons: "*With the arrival of the pacification police the weapons left. We can't say that the traffickers left, because there are still some remnants, but the weapons left and they were our biggest fear.*"[31]

The end of the domination of the traffickers means that they hold less fascination for the young people: "*I know that my children will not grow up with the vision of the traffickers, thinking that this is the fantasy life.*"[32]

The right to come and go with some level of security means that now the adults can travel to work, and their children can attend school, without worrying that violence will occur: "*There used to be so much shooting here. Now we can all go down and come back up the hill tranquilly.*"[33]

The beginning of a different type of police presence: "*Now we know the police working in our community. Before they would come, they would shoot, the traffickers would shoot and the police would leave. Today we know their names, we know who they are and they know who we are too.*"[34]

The expectations – still unrealized, yet hopefully in progress – that the increased security would bring more investment in these impoverished communities where

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[30] Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
[31] Discussion with a resident of Borel on June 17, 2011
[32] Discussion with a resident of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
[33] Discussion with a resident of Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 25, 2011
[34] Discussion with a resident of Providência on June 10, 2011

infrastructure is often deficient and social services are almost absent: "*The streets have potholes; water only comes through the pipes once a week; sewage flows through open canals that haven't been cleaned in years and they overflow every time there is a strong rain. We want complete security, not just the police invasion, but also a social invasion.*"[35]

Outsiders working in the community agree that security is much improved. According to a social outreach coordinator for an urban upgrading project, it was difficult to work in the informal settlements previously controlled by the traffickers. He remembered how much of his time was spent dealing with problems of violence. The government's offices were built to withstand bullets; the construction workers had problems coming to work when violence broke out between the traffickers and the police; the traffickers would block the streets with burnt cars, large stones and even trash to impede the police vehicles from entering; the police operations were unpredictable and violence was indiscriminate. "How," he asked, "could I discuss citizenship with a father whose son had been killed by the police?"[36] Moreover, all urbanization projects were negotiated with the traffickers in advance, not directly by the public authorities, but with community intermediaries so as not to disrupt construction. He remembered how they would need the traffickers' support to accomplish almost anything in the community:

For months we had been trying to convince the residents not to throw their trash out in the open but to deposit it at fixed points in the community for pickup, but nothing seemed to work, and the trash kept accumulating. One day the traffickers put up a sign saying that it was forbidden to throw trash anywhere but at the collection points, and suddenly there was no more trash.[37]

The traffickers would permit urban upgrading projects, so long as they did not widen the streets (because this would facilitate police access) or improve public lighting (for the same reason). With the pacification police it was not that the drug trade had ended but, "the state has made itself more present".[38]

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[35] Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
[36] Discussion with a UPP recruit in Turano on July 11, 2011
[37] Interview with Francisco Mirilli on June 3, 2011
[38] Ibid

Many residents said that the security brought by the pacification police also has its burdens. While recognizing some police as "friendly, participatory, wanting to become closer to the residents,"[39] many see their impositions as not so different from those of the traffickers. These tensions are especially evident during the police searches. The police say that they need to stop and search the residents to prove that they will not permit the resurgence of the drug trade. The police need to prevent the return of the traffickers, but the residents feel as though they are under constant vigilance. They see the searches as discriminatory, stemming from the mistaken belief that most of the community was once connected to the traffickers. Some even say that the police searches inhibit their ability to come and go in ways that are reminiscent of the time when the traffickers controlled the community. At a community meeting, a father confronted the police over their searches of his son:

Every police search becomes more and more violent. They think that our children are criminals. What has my son done to offend the police? It seems that if your face is poor, or if it's black or if it's dirty then you must be a bandit, but if there are no more traffickers here then why are we treated like criminals? The treatment of the police there (referring to the city) must be the same as the police here (the favela). We are from here, so we have a right to walk around without harassment."[40]

But what is most striking about these meetings, when the residents confront the police over complaints about their searches and the captains promise to punish police abuses, is that these conversations are occurring after years when there was no recourse against police repression. There are now spaces for confrontation, opportunities for communication. The residents understand that the pacification police are intended to be different. As an example, the resident's association of Santa Marta published a pamphlet on citizen rights explaining under what conditions the police can conduct searches and what information they can demand from the residents (Visão da Favela Brazil 2010). It reveals the divergence between the types of treatment that they were accustomed to receiving before from the military police and what they can expect now from the pacification police. There was even the

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[39] Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011
[40] Resident speaking at a community meeting in Mineira on July 6, 2011

feeling that, "the pacification police came here to protect us from the police."[41] This is not to dismiss the disagreements over the police searches, especially the constant criticism of them at every community meeting, even those supposed to be focused on other things, but only to underline that something is different now that the residents can openly criticize the police.

In addition to enduring suspicions of the police, deepened by ongoing abuses of police authority, one of the obstacles in bridging the divide between the residents and the police is the legacy of the traffickers. Although difficult for me to detect as an outsider, the residents affirm that the traffickers are still present, or at least they maintain a symbolic permanence inside the community. Some signs are very stark, such as the graffiti, delineating which area was dominated by which faction. The red letters of the *Comando Vermelho* are painted on walls, including warnings to the police to stay away. There are even more recent messages threatening the police to leave because *we are returning home*. Yet the residents do not need the graffiti to be reminded that the traffickers still watch over them. As one said about the difference between the past and the present, "with the arrival of the pacification police the weapons left, and the weapons were what we feared, but the movement, truthfully, it continues in a more hidden way."[42]

Although only the remnants remain, the traffickers influence the community in subtle yet powerful ways. As a resident recalled, "we lived under the traffickers for more than twenty years; they had a way of organizing our lives, of regulating who could enter and leave, of what we could and could not do; this is ingrained in our heads."[43] Their sway over residents is known as the power of suggestion (*poder de sugestão*), where the residents fear talking too much about the traffickers, or appearing too willing to cooperate with the police, because this would become a liability if the traffickers return, as many are wary that they will. The traffickers go to great lengths to retain their sway over the community. A displaced faction was said to have warned residents not to give food to the police, or let the police use

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[41] Interview with a resident of Providência from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH
[42] Discussion with residents in Borel on July 16, 2011
[43] Discussion with residents in Prazeres on May 31, 2011

their bathrooms, and two were threatened for breaking this rule. The traffickers even ordered local businesses to remain closed (which they did), revealing their enduring power, though their weapons are no longer visible on the streets. The police tore down some physical reminders of the traffickers, such a wall between neighboring communities that also separated warring factions as well as the lookouts where the traffickers would watch for the police. Yet distrust of the police persists, both because of their past violence and because the residents fear that their departure will signify the return of the traffickers. Summarizing the tensions between the past domination of the traffickers and the present police occupation, one resident said:

> *It's difficult for us to change our minds from one moment to the next and think the police are here to help our community. There are many who hate the police because they witnessed police killings in the past. Some people fear the presence of the police more than the presence, though veiled, of the traffickers.*[44]

Distrust is mutual and self-perpetuating. The residents do not believe that the police will be permanently stationed in their communities, and they associate the end of the pacification police with the inevitable return of the traffickers. These doubts are invariably tied to the failures of past policing experiments. The police are also suspicious of ongoing ties to the traffickers. The police acknowledge that drugs are still sold in the community, though they refer to this as the "ant's traffic" because it is small and only meets internal demand. As one captain said, "There is no illusion that the traffickers disappeared; there are low-ranking ones in the community, but they sell in much lower quantities."[45] They understand why the residents resist their searches, but they claim that they are necessary to prevent the resurgence of the traffickers. It was territorial coexistence between the police and the traffickers that undermined past community policing programs, thus the police say that firmness is imperative to convince the residents that this time they will be permanent. As one captain said, "If I apprehend a trafficker then I win twenty supporters, but if I decide

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[44] Discussion with residents in Providência on July 10, 2011
[45] Discussion with a resident of Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantago on July 5, 2011

to ignore him, because he only has a small amount of drugs, then I lose five."[46] The pacification police struggle to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the residents by balancing their stance against the traffickers (otherwise they would be seen as corrupt) without being overly coercive (otherwise this would be reminiscent of police repression).

Proximity between the Pacification Police and the Children

To enhance their perception in the eyes of the residents the pacification police focus their attention on the children. As several explained, the adults and the adolescents already have a negative impression of the police, much of which was ingrained in them by years of police violence, but the children are more receptive. Their hope is that because the children are less biased against the police that they will translate their acceptance to the rest of their family. A teacher told me that whereas before they were accustomed to giving classes during shootings between traffickers and the police, now there is tranquility among the students who can attend school more regularly because they no longer fear random violence.[47] The pacification police also sponsor activities, such as martial arts, music and dance classes, and these are often taught by police officers. As a police captain explained while surrounded by children playing with his hat, "starting with the children is an opportunity to change their perceptions of the police."[48] He organized a soccer competition for children from several different communities. The Sunday afternoon event brought together off-duty officers (he attended in civilian clothes with his wife) as well as residents, with this kind of inter-mingling between the residents and the police something unimaginable in the past.

It is often the policewomen who are the closest with the children. I saw few women on patrol; instead most work on outreach with the community. I spoke with several about their involvement in a drug resistance program in the local schools where in addition to talking about prevention they also explain the role of the

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[46] Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 16, 2011
[47] Interview with a teacher working in Borel on June 17, 2011
[48] Interview with a UPP Captain in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011

pacification police. They do not wear their uniforms because they say that this facilitates their interaction with the children. In the words of one, "we are attempting to show a different side of the police, a more human side. And when the children say they do not like the police we try to explain why we are different."[49] She said there was resistance, especially from those whose family members were killed by the police or connected to the traffickers, and this she could understand, but she tried to show, "we are not here to repress but to show another opportunity, another path."[50] For the anniversary of the pacification police, the children painted pictures of before, with guns in the arms of traffickers and the armored cars of the police climbing the hill for confrontation, and after, with the pacification police holding hands with the children and saying hello to people on the street. The parents confirm the benefits of the pacification police for their children. As a mother explained as she waited outside the police station for her daughter to finish a dance class, "If they are permanent then the pacification police will benefit the next generation. The children will have a better reference of the police and they will see that weapons are not necessary."[51] The pacification police are praised by residents for providing a better reality for the children, who are no longer as tempted by the violence and the luxury of the traffickers and can admire the police in ways that were impossible before.

Yet while the pacification police have worked to improve their perception in the eyes of the children, there remains skepticism even among the youngest. The police on patrol say that children sometimes throw stones at their cars.[52] A captain recalled saying hello to a boy, but when the child said hello back to him his mother began hitting him, yelling that he could not talk to the police. In the captains' words, "His mother was raised to avoid dialogue with the police because before if you entered a police station you died, either at the hands of the police or in retaliation by the traffickers. She was hitting him so that he would not talk to us; she was trying to

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[49] Discussion with a UPP recruits in Turano on July 6, 2011
[50] Ibid
[51] Discussion with a resident of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
[52] Discussion with UPP recruits in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011

protect him."[53] A policewoman described her work with the pacification police as transforming obstacles, questioning mentalities, because if it were not so difficult then it would not be so rewarding. She knew that it was essential to transform the negative perceptions, but there were moments of despair, as she remembered how her unit accompanied a group of children to a performance of Disney on Ice. As they were boarding the bus the children started singing a song related to the faction that controlled their community months before. She told me, "I was heartbroken. It was like the children had been manipulated and they were still scared of the traffickers. There is the need to break everything and start all over again."[54]

Tensions between the Pacification Police and the Adolescents

Probably the most contentious part of the pacification police is the controversy over the *baile funk*, or the funk dances that in the time of the traffickers took place almost every weekend and were the main source of entertainment for the young residents. Before, the *bailes* would begin on Friday evenings and last through Sunday. With the pacification police, they were initially banned. The police said that this was to ensure that the remnants of the traffickers did not return, but their firmness soon conflicted with many residents' desire to hold the dances. There is still no common policy for the *bailes*; in some communities they are permitted until a certain hour, in others they require the approval of the captain, and in some they are forbidden. A young resident defended the dances, "The *bailes* were not only for the traffickers, but now they are forbidden because the police say that the music favors the traffickers. Funk is part of our culture and its prohibition is discriminatory."[55] From the perspective of the police, the *bailes* recall the time of the traffickers because it was at these parties that they sold their drugs and the music praised the power of the kingpins. The pacification police earned the enmity of many residents both for banning the *baile funk* and setting limits on how late they can now go into the night. According to one captain, "the *baile* was where the

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[53] Discussion with UPP recruits in Turano on July 6, 2011
[54] Interview of UPP recruit in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 26, 2011
[55] Discussion with residents of Borel on July 17, 2011

traffickers earned their power, they were financed by the traffickers because this was where drugs were sold and music was played to glorify the traffickers."[56] In contrast, several residents with whom I spoke saw the *baile funk* as cultural expressions of their community, or at least as unjustly stigmatized by the police. As one complained:

> *The shootings ended, but we live under a dictatorship of the police. They prohibit everything; everything requires their approval. Funk has been vetoed. Young people always have to submit to vexing searches. Of course it's good to no longer hear shootings, but to have peace we lost liberty.*[57]

To understand this debate it is first important to provide some background. Over the past two decades the *baile funk* developed into a vibrant and essential part of the urban youth culture of Rio de Janeiro, especially in the *favelas*. It is described both as an empowering musical practice and an intrinsic element of the traffickers' control (Sneed 2008, 59-60). Given its sexually explicit dance moves and its lyrical association with the drug factions, funk has been criticized as a violent (and socially irresponsible) musical form. Yet attending a *baile* reveals its undeniable significance for many young people. Attending a *baile* means mixing with a density of people moving in all directions, pulsating to the music, making it difficult to breathe, even dance, but from personal experience exhilarating. Inverting the social geography of Rio de Janeiro, almost all songs are written by and about people living in the *favelas*, humanizing daily lives and struggles (Sneed 2008, 70). The traffickers appropriated the *baile* when they took control of the community. They sponsored *bailes* where drugs were sold in abundance and weapons openly brandished. The association between the *baile funk* and the traffickers gave rise to a subgenre known as *proibidão*, whose songs are about the factions and their most notorious gangsters. The *proibidão* are prohibited from the radio and only performed live at the *bailes* because they praise the traffickers, glorify their violence and warn the police to stay away. For these reasons the pacification police banned the *baile funk*.

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[56] Interview of UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 7, 2011
[57] Discussion with residents of Borel on July 17, 2011

While the rules imposed by the pacification police concerning the *baile funk* are different across the communities, the tension is common to all. In one pacified community surrounded by others still controlled by the traffickers, an officer stated emphatically, "I have no problem with the music but with the consumption of drugs. If we hold a *baile* then people from the surrounding communities will come and this will only show that we are giving space to the traffickers to return. I will quit if there is ever a baile in the community."[58] In contrast, a captain in a different community among the first to permit the return of the *bailes* said, "I do not want to be the mayor of the community."[59] Shortly after taking command, he held a meeting where the residents voted to hold the *bailes* but only until two in the morning. He thought that the difference between the time of the traffickers and the time of the pacification police is that now there could be a consensus. Before it was dangerous to complain to the traffickers about the loud music. Several officers mentioned that despite complaints about their regulations over the *baile funk* that the residents complimented them for making the community more livable since the loud music did not play all night. One captain said that he even received more complaints when he permitted the *bailes* than when he prohibited them:

> *Do you want to know the biggest problem that I face today? Loud music! The residents have the right to play music at parties, but their neighbors have rights too. Who would have imagined that in a community once dominated by the traffickers that the biggest problem would be loud music?*[60]

Yet the regulation of the *baile funk* is the main point of conflict between the adolescents of the community and the pacification police. The young residents often complain that without the bailes there is nothing for them to do in the community. Comparing the excitement about the pacification police in the media to his more monotonous reality, one young resident said:

> *You turn on the television and you see the presenters saying that you can visit our community, that you will have no problem now that the traffickers are no longer*

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[58] Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 7, 2011
[59] Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone on July 1, 2011
[60] Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 12, 2011

here. But why would you come here? To do what? We no longer have anything to do. I didn't like the weapons and the drugs at the baile funk, so why don't the police just permit us to have a baile without criminals?[61]

The pacification police recognize this tension with the adolescents, not only because they are sometimes the ones most connected to the traffickers (directly by working with them or indirectly because the traffickers were their peers) but also because the police still see them with suspicion. Some left school to work for the traffickers; others stopped studying because there are no middle or high schools located in their community.[62] Many young residents are known colloquially as *nem-nem*, for *nem trabalha, nem estuda*, or never worked, never studied. This is not to imply that all were connected to the traffickers but they are certainly the most resistant to the presence of the pacification police. The police say that the only way to win them over is with education and employment, but this is insufficient for those who grew up mesmerized by the traffickers. As a captain explained:

The pacification police cannot transform the reality of the adolescents. They are sitting on the sidewalk waiting for us to leave. Their best time was with the traffickers, but their plans – to get rich, to have many women and to die by the age of twenty – were destroyed with our arrival. They never studied so they have no opportunities. It's very difficult to change this perspective.[63]

Everyday Transformations Underway

Without denying the tensions between the pacification police and the young residents, the very fact that there are community meetings where these grievances can be voiced marks a significant change from the past. Encounters between the police and the residents are an occasion to address their divergences on problems ranging from the police searches and their rules on the *baile funk*. While saying that they understand why many residents are bothered by these impositions, the police also provide their perspective. During a community meeting, a policeman said that

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[61] Discussion with residents in Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho on July 5, 2011
[62] There is no middle school in Cidade de Deus, a place of 36,500 people (according to 2010 Census)
[63] Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Northern Zone on July 16, 2011

the residents had preconceived, prejudiced notions of the police, "the young people look at us as if we were the worst things in the world."[64] In response, a young resident admitted that many of his friends reviled the police, and only one year of the pacification police was too short to break old paradigms. The meeting also included role-play, whereby young residents and police recruits simulated a police search, but with their roles reversed, so that the residents acted as policemen and the policemen as residents. A policeman pretended to be a young resident who refused to show what was in his backpack, and the two imitated an argument similar to the ones that would often occur on the street. The intention was to show the residents how it was difficult for the police to do their job without cooperation from the community. They saw how police frustration could escalate when all they wanted to see was that there were no drugs or weapons in the bag. When both pretended to fight over the refusal to open the backpack it made everybody laugh at the reality of what really happened.

There are moments such as these when the deep-seated doubts between the police and the residents are temporarily broken, moments that the commander of the pacification police described as, "recognizing each other's common humanity, a recognition that had been missing because of the violence that the police inflicted on the residents and the territorial control exerted by the traffickers."[65] The pacification police attend most community meetings, even those about mundane topics such as the location of the trash bins in the community, as these are moments to learn about their most important concerns. The residents often change the topic to bring up problems with the police. Residents from various communities said that especially at night, when the captain was not there, that the most truculent policemen would threaten them. It cannot be denied that the pacification police never abuse their powers over the residents, or overstep their authority in imposing police searches and rules about the *baile funk*, but there are everyday changes in how policing is done with the pacification police. In the words of a police captain:

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[64] Discussion among UPP recruits and young residents in Borel on June 17, 2011
[65] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011

Before people that wouldn't speak with me now speak, or at least they say good morning; people that used to say good morning now come inside the station; people that would come inside the building now talk to me on the street."[66]

Both the residents and the police said that this transition would take time. Speaking to a captain during a community meeting, one resident said, "It's difficult for us to change from one hour to the next to think that the police who were once shooting their way into the community are now here to help us. There are many who hate the police, who fear the police, who are wary of the pacification police."[67] Responding to her criticism, because she said that most of her neighbors were too scared to report abuses since they feared retaliation, the police officer thanked her for coming forward, "your courage is proof that the pacification police are working."[68]

In many ways they are working. The pacification police are unlike precedents of policing the informal settlements. This is not to deny persistent tensions between the residents and the police, nor ongoing resistance inside the military police, but the differences with the past are undeniable. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in meetings bringing together residents and the police, opportunities unimaginable when the traffickers controlled these communities and interactions with the police were dominated by violence. The residents who make accusations against the police say that their neighbors are reluctant to come forward with more, but the fact that some residents are speaking up reveals how things are changing.

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[66] Interview of a UPP Captain in Central Zone from unpublished material prepared by SEASDH
[67] Resident speaking at a community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 30, 2011
[68] UPP officer speaking at community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 30, 2011

CHAPTER 4: Untangling Metaphors of War

This chapter tells the story of the pacification police from the perspective of the police. The side of the police is one that is often not told. They are portrayed as villains – violent and/or corrupt – without almost any assessment of their motives. As many past programs of community policing were undermined from within, the purpose in providing the perspective of the police is to study what is different (or not) about the pacification police. Much like past attempts at reform where the initiative came from inside the military police, the primary backers of the pacification police are those working for them. In addition to telling the story of those patrolling the streets, it dwells on the possibility that the pacification police are a step towards reforming the military police. Despite all that makes them distinct, the pacification police are still trained to be military police; yet this is something that the pacification police commander is hoping to change. In place of a police that sees security only through the lens of repression, he wants to reform the police in the mold of community policing. What is most interesting is that in many ways the pacification police are being formed into community policemen and women less by their training and more by their everyday interactions with residents on the streets of the informal settlements.

The captains say that residents knock on their door less often to report police abuses and more often to complain about local problems, such as streets littered with trash because the municipality no longer comes to collect it. The pacification police have become the informal locus of community concerns as well as formal interlocutors with public authorities responsible for providing these services. Often in the peripheral communities, the pacification police are among the few public authorities physically present and listening. The pacification police were installed to contain the violence emanating from these spaces and pave the way for a more complete state presence. Yet their challenge is to make their intensified presence less violent, less corrupt and more approachable for the population. This means undoing a history of police violence, both inside the minds of residents who remain

wary of the police, as well as within the military police, which is torn between path-dependent mentalities resistant to reform and reform-minded officers who seek to transform the military police.

**Everyday Experiences of the Pacification Police**

Relatively little is known about the perceptions of the police themselves. An internal evaluation is important for several reasons. First, for the pacification police to be sustainable, they require support from those putting community policing into practice, especially as discontent among the police will be reflected in their relations with the residents. Second, for the pacification police to induce police reform, they need legitimacy in the eyes of the police, as without their acceptance of community policing it is unlikely that things will change on the ground. If those trained in the precepts of community policing do not incorporate these ideas into practice then it will be difficult to translate this philosophy to the rest of the military police. Third, given their insider knowledge of how the pacification police work in practice, their suggestions are essential to improve the program. If the police are not integral to the process of reform, then the pacification police will be undermined from within.

A survey[69] of 359 pacification police recruits by the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies at the University Candido Mendes in Rio de Janeiro sets forth their perspective. To my understanding it is the only quantitative study that asks the pacification police what they think. Around 40 percent were satisfied with their job most of the time. When asked to suggest improvements to the pacification police, 50 percent cited the working conditions. Many recruits live far from the city and there are no bathrooms or secure places to store their valuables. While complaints about working conditions are common to most military police, the pacification police should earn a bonus payment (intended to reduce corruption), but there are reports it is not paid on time. It is interesting to note that 27 percent of recruits thought that community relations was the best part of their job, while 27 percent cited it as the worst part of their job, underlining one of the most persistent tensions surrounding

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[69] *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policias* by the Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (CESeC) (the survey was carried out between November and December 2010)

the pacification police...the difficulty of overcoming mutual suspicions between the residents and the police.

Police Evaluations of Working Conditions

	Good	Normal	Terrible
Salary	6.4%	33.7%	59.9%
Uniforms	21.7%	32.1%	46.2%
Bathrooms	13.4%	21.8%	64.8%
Dormitories	8.8%	10.7%	80.5%
Support, food, housing	30.6%	43.5%	25.9%
Punctuality of bonus payment	18.4%	41.8%	39.8%
Distance between community and home	22.3%	24.5%	53.2%
Distance between community and batallion	73.0%	21.6%	5.4%
Conditions of their base in community	38.4%	26.1%	35.5%
Relations with military police	37.4%	38.9%	23.7%

Best Aspects of Work With Pacification Police

- Working conditions 30%
- Relations with community 27%
- Less risk 21%
- Community policing 7%
- Colleagues/captain 7%
- Nothing positive 7%
- Other 1%

Worst Aspects of Work With Pacification Police

- Working conditions 50%
- Relations with community 27%
- Other 7%
- Not police work 6%
- Proximity to suspects 5%
- Nothing negative 3%
- Colleagues/captain 2%

Regarding training, a surprisingly high 63 percent said that they received adequate training to work in the pacification police (this is surprising because the officers said that training in community policing was the most lacking). Of their training, they recalled courses in ethics, community policing, cautious use of force, techniques to search suspects, human rights, personal defense, public relations and shooting. Their most cited responsibilities were conflict mediation, domestic violence reduction and authorization of leisure activities, hinting at the contentious nature of

the *baile funk*. Though few thought resolving infrastructure problems was their role, most said that collaborating with public agencies, identifying community problems, developing sport and educational activities and providing social assistance was what they should be doing. Yet only 5 percent said that they attend community meetings with frequency, pointing to possible disconnects in the precepts of community policing and the actuality of policing the informal settlements.

What Are Police Responsibilities

Responsibility	Percent
Help resolve infrastructure problems	33.0%
Organize parties and events	54.3%
Provide assistance to community	70.5%
Develop sport and educational activities	75.7%
Identify community problems	83.0%
Collaborate with public authorities	84.1%
Prohibit and authorize leisure activities	85.4%
Domestic violence reduction	95.8%
Conflict mediation	98.6%

Most Frequent Police Activities

Activity	Percent
Meetings with residents	5.0%
Activities with children and elderly	12.8%
Receiving visitors and tourists	16.2%
Surveying problems	27.9%
Meetings with superiors	32.0%
Registering incidences with civil police	45.5%
Receiving complaints	59.9%
Searching suspects	79.4%

The majority of respondents (94 percent) thought that they needed to carry a gun. Most said this was for protection against the traffickers, though some acknowledged that it was to intimidate the residents. When asked what they most feared about their job, 55 percent said an encounter with a trafficker. When asked how the

Police Perception of Community Perceptions of the Police

residents thought of them, they admitted the distrust but said that things were changing; only 4 percent thought that the residents were initially positive about the police, but this rose to 24 percent when asked about now, though the majority still thought that the residents disliked them. They said that the children and elderly were the most receptive while the adolescents were the most hostile. Given the everyday difficulties of the informal settlements, including difficult physical access, dearth of infrastructure and distrust by residents, 70 percent of the pacification police recruits said that they would prefer to work directly with the military police.

The survey results contrast the very positive external evaluation of the pacification police with the internal complaints about what is lacking. They are portrayed in the media as innovative, of bringing change not only to the informal settlements but also within the police, but the recruits say that they feel much less involved. On one level, they appear to understand the ideas of community policing, at least as articulated by many of the most important activities that the pacification police are meant to undertake; yet on another level, it is not only that they do not implement these activities in practice, as their most frequent activity is searching suspects, but also that they believe that they are still distrusted by the residents. While their concerns with working conditions may appear individualistic and confined, if not addressed they could undermine the broader initiatives that the pacification police intend to accomplish. If the precepts of community policing can convince the pacification police then they will more likely permeate the rest of the military police.

Although the recruits that I spoke with were positive about the pacification police, their experiences are not without some difficulties. I spoke with several who lived in communities still controlled by the traffickers. They told me about having to remove their uniforms before returning home to keep their profession secret from their neighbors. Just as residents are wary of the police, the police are frightened of working in communities where they are vulnerable to attacks by the traffickers. One told me how he was scared to walk around the community unarmed, as the captain had prohibited the police from carrying guns during the daytime hours:

Everybody is concerned with the security of the residents, but who is concerned with our security? I don't live in the community but in another part of the city still controlled by the traffickers. What would happen to my family if they found out that I was a policeman?[70]

Others who come from the interior of the state told me how they travel several hours to work, where they face trying conditions because of the routine difficulties of working in the informal settlements as well as the hasty preparation of the pacification police. One year after the inauguration of some units, several do not have an actual building to work out of; instead the pacification police operate out of mobile offices that resemble large metal containers. These are uncomfortable, especially in the intense heat of the summer, and undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the community, as the police feel that these impermanent structures signal that the pacification police will only be there temporarily. There are sometimes no bathrooms designated for police use, which puts them in an awkward position when they have to ask the residents to use their facilities. Those with designated police structures say that having an actual building greatly facilitates their work because it demonstrates to the community that this time their presence will be permanent. The pacification police in one community restored a six-story building on the main street to serve as their station. In another, they appropriated a building used by the traffickers as their base. Graffiti still marks the territories of the traffickers, but the

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[70] Discussion with a policeman in Tabajaras/Cabritos on June 3, 2011

pacification police want to demonstrate their physical and symbolic presence in these communities.

From Pacifying the Informal Settlements to Pacifying the Military Police

The many different demands placed on the pacification police broaden the mandate of the police in the informal settlements. According to the first pacification police commander, "there is conflict over the training of the military police, disputes over what it means to be a policeman."[71] The dissonance between their militarized training and their daily routine of patrolling the community is symbolized by what he terms the "warrior ethos". He hopes that the pacification police will become part of a process of "permanent education" to inculcate a new mentality in the military police; yet their inclination towards violence is rooted in their militarized training:

> *The training of the military police is the formation of a warrior ethos...much like how violence held a symbolic value for the traffickers, with the police as their enemy, the military police are trained not to recognize the humanity of the residents, who they see as their enemy.*[72]

In order to help me understand the dehumanization process inherent to their training, he evoked the movie *Tropa de Elite* about the elite squad of the military police. In fact, numerous policemen mentioned the movie because in telling their story it both generated sympathy for the military police and sensationalized their violence. Specifically, he retold the story of Matias, a recruit to the military police who devoted himself to undoing police corruption and attending law school. He is portrayed differently than the majority of the military police, both intellectually cognizant of its failures and determined to improve the military police from within. This is until he is initiated into the elite squad, where he is trained in the mentality of war, and when he was transformed into a soldier. In the final scene, Matias beats one of the traffickers to the ground, puts his rifle in his bloodied face and shoots him

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[71] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011
[72] Ibid

without mercy. According to the pacification police commander, the movie explains how the police are trained to be warriors inside the informal settlements. In his own words, "our identity is very similar to the armed forces; we are trained not to identify with our opponents; a soldier cannot do this in battle and the police are trained in the same way."[73]

The pacification police are a step towards undermining the warrior ethos. After six months of training in the military police academy, all those destined to serve in the pacification police (an estimated 90 percent of the recruits) receive a two-week course on community policing. The commander of the pacification police says that this is more symbolic than practical because he spends more time undoing the militaristic training they learned in the military police than training them in the day-to-day rituals of community policing.[74] But this is a process of transition according to an official in the State Secretary of Public Security.[75] She is currently teaching a more integrated human rights program in the military police academy. In addition, she created an education committee of officials from five state security forces to review their curricula in a formal setting. One problem from before was that the instructors at the military police academy (all military policemen and women) were working for free, making it difficult to coordinate their training, especially when they taught conflicting ideas. The reforms require that instructors are selected and paid in a more transparent matter and that they adjust their teaching to the community-policing curriculum. The objective is that the pacification police will no longer have separate training in community policing because all of the military police recruits will be trained according to these principles.

The pacification police told me that there is intense skepticism of community policing within the military police. According to one captain:

I have no support from the institution. We are lacking so many things here, and everything that I achieve I have to do on my own because the pacification police

[73] Interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29, 2011
[74] Ibid
[75] From an interview of Juliana Barroso by Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg, as published in the working paper *The Pacification of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro*

aren't supported inside the institution. It is supported from the outside, among the population of the city, but not inside the police itself.[76]

To counter this suspicion inside the military police, the pacification police point to criminal indices in the informal settlements where they are working, underlining the dramatic declines in violence compared to when the military police, with their repressive methods, operated in these areas. They recognize their divergences with the military police, and understand the danger of creating two distinct forces, one for the pacified informal settlements and another for the rest of the city, but the pacification police officers are optimistic as to whose strategy will prevail:

I don't see any possibility that the pacification police would not continue. After all the work that has been done to remove the traffickers from the favelas, it would be impossible for any politician to abandon them and return them to the traffickers once again. They could change the name, but I believe that the only way to keep the traffickers away is by permanent policing.[77]

Moreover, the possibilities of promotion mean that most pacification police officers will eventually return to the military police. As one told me about this transition:

Things were more difficult last year, but everyday is better than yesterday. We need to conquer each resident, each child, each adult. We also need to conquer the police with this attitude. This is an ideological re-conquest. Every day is a re-conquest of territory, but not necessarily physical territory. It is an ideological re-conquest of both the residents and the police.[78]

It is hoped that by training in the precepts of community policing, starting with the pacification police and expanding outwards to the rest of the military police, will deconstruct the warrior ethos that has long characterized the military police.

Mediating Between States and Citizens

It is outside the military police academy and on the streets of the informal settlements where the pacification police are receiving their best training in

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[76] Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in Santa Teresa on July 1, 2011
[77] Discussion with UPP recruits in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on July 1, 2011
[78] Interview of a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone conducted on July 1, 2011

community policing. In their everyday interactions with residents, mediating their ongoing needs with the responsibilities of the public authorities, the pacification police are reforming the police by becoming service providers to the community.

The arrival of the pacification police has brought some improvements in the provision of much needed, but still deficient, infrastructure and social services. The traffickers no longer monopolize the distribution of cooking gas so its price has gone down. The police have regulated the ubiquitous moto-taxis that transport residents from the top to the bottom of the hill in the absence of public transportation. The electricity company was one of the first to enter the communities to formalize the once pirated connections. Although there is controversy over the cost burden on those whose electricity consumption is now metered and billed, many residents say that they appreciate having higher quality services because "we want someone who we can appeal to."[79] The company has a social tariff to give residents a discount on their electricity bill, and they have hired a vast array of community interlocutors to educate residents on reducing their electricity consumption to manage their bills. The security provided by the pacification police also means the end of the *gato-net*, or illegal television cable hookups, and there is significant competition among cable television providers to enroll new customers with social tariffs. There are efforts by the public garbage collection company to attend to the challenging geographies of the informal settlements, including building motorcycles that can carry trash on a cart attached to the back (because these can access the steep and narrow roads which trucks cannot reach). These anecdotes are not to give the misimpression that infrastructure projects are ongoing in all of the informal settlements, and meetings bringing together service providers with residents are infused with the tensions of enduring unattended to demands, but they reveal that the pacification police are also seen as an opportunity to enhance service provision and undertake infrastructure projects that were more difficult in the time of the traffickers.

While they want to be receptive to these demands, the pacification police feel that it is beyond their capacity to meet most of them. These demands test the limits

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[79] Discussion with residents in Cidade de Deus on January 12, 2012

of the mandate of the police, but as they are the first to arrive in the community they are charged with articulating its needs and coordinating with service providers. It is difficult to generalize the extent of these demands across different communities, but the police are well aware of what is lacking. The captains designate their most communicative recruits as proximity police, who are charged with circulating inside the community, learning the residents' main concerns and attempting to bring these needs to the attention of the relevant government agencies or service providers. In certain communities they even walk around without uniforms to foster approachability with the residents. The residents point out that the proximity police have provided important support, such as taking a pregnant woman to the hospital in one of the police cars because her house was not on a road that an ambulance could reach. One proximity policemen told me that many residents did not know about the *Bolsa Familia* conditional cash-transfer program that entitled families making less than minimum wage to financial support as long as they send their children to school and bring them to a doctor to receive their vaccinations. He was disturbed by the case of several children walking around the community alone while their mother passed out pamphlets to support her family. He learned that she could not send her children to the public school because she did not have their birth certificates, nor the money to buy their uniforms. While he could have ignored them as they were not his responsibility, or passed the children to a welfare agency without a second thought that they would be taken from their mother, instead he is making repeated efforts to resolve the situation because he understands that this is why the pacification police are there.[80]

The pacification police are mediators between the unmet demands and the practical difficulties of serving these geographically complex and impoverished communities, but they feel that many demands made on them are far beyond their training or even their capacity as police. Their impression is that they were thrown into the informal settlements with barely any support:

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[80] Discussion with a UPP recruit in Tabajaras/Cabritos on June 3, 2011

The police cannot fix all the problems overnight. The aims of the pacification police are to take away the weapons and to reconquer the credibility of the police, but our isolated presence here will not resolve anything. We are only here to provide security so that other services can take place.[81]

Despite their attempts to be responsive to the demands of the community, the pacification police are dependent on the support of urban upgrading projects and social services that only other public authorities can provide. The police provide the security to make this happen, and the publicity surrounding the pacification police puts more pressure on the state to act; but ultimately the police are dependent on myriad other interventions to reduce the divides that have long disconnected the informal settlements from the rest of the city. They can be receptacles of community demands but if these needs are not addressed then the pacification police will inevitably loose legitimacy in the eyes of the residents, regardless of the reforms taking place inside the military police. The police provide a measure of security, with many residents seeing the presence of the pacification police as encompassing a broader notion of security, one needed to address the roots of their poverty, or as one captain said, "public security includes everybody, not just the police."[82]

The security provided by the pacification police is essential in bringing other services that aim to address the underlying insecurities of the informal settlements, from their lack of tenure to their inadequate infrastructure to their persistent poverty. But the impact of the pacification police goes far beyond security. The pacification police have become the frontline service providers in many communities where the public authorities have long been absent. The residents come to them when they want to report a power line that is in danger of falling over, or when they notice that there is no trash collection, or when there is a pothole on the road that needs to be fixed so that the trucks of the electricity company and the garbage company can come up the hill to address these problems. There are difficulties in putting these responsibilities on the police, especially when this demands much more than their training provided them, but community policing is

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[81] Discussion with a UPP recruit in Turano on July 11, 2011
[82] Interview with a UPP Captain in a community in the Southern Zone on July 1, 2011

about connecting the police to the community, and by being present in these communities and connecting their concerns with the electricity company, the garbage company, or the municipal public works agency, the pacification police are more than mediating concerns between the urban informal poor and the public authorities but connecting the informal settlements to state.

The security provided by the pacification police means that the state is more present in ways that it rarely was before when the traffickers controlled the informal settlements. This is true not only of the police as the state on the streets but also of the residents who can come and go from their community without fear of violence breaking out between the traffickers and the police, the utilities who can now widen roads, connect public lighting and make other investments that the traffickers would prevent because it made the community less protected against the police, not to mention the myriad other public and private authorities who no longer have the excuse of insecurity for not servicing these communities. In my interviews with the pacification police I found them very interested, desperate even, for news of when these investments would happen. The police have become receptacles for the communities' most important needs, from whose house was in danger of falling down in the next rainfall to when the government was finally going to fulfill its promise to reconstruct the kindergarten that collapsed during the last rainy season, from where the residents could deposit their garbage for collection to who qualified for the social tariff for electricity, from what light post needed repair to when the massive pothole in the main road was going to be filled…the demands upon the state are many, and most of these find their way to the pacification police as the most present (or at least the most visible) public authority in the community.

As revealed in Rio de Janeiro and confirmed in countless cities around the world, it is difficult to separate urban development programs from public security policies because insecurity directly impacts service provision and urban upgrading indirectly impacts experiences of security. It is often thought that security means sending in the police. This *mano dura* approach to public security has been criticized when the police inflict their own violence, often deepening experiences of insecurity, but what is a government to do? Reestablishing security in situations of

conflict almost always necessitates some demonstration of force by the coercive arm of the state. It is difficult to argue that only urban upgrading would displace armed criminals. There are two contrasting (often opposing) policies in integrating urban development with reductions in urban violence: traditional heavy-handed security such as the police and untraditional alternatives such as urban infrastructure or service provision. The pacification police are an example of how this dichotomy can be reconciled. They pave the way for service providers in the informal settlements, both by enhancing security and making these communities more visible and their infrastructure deficits more pressing for the city authorities. For cities such as Rio de Janeiro where it is difficult to disentangle where public security ends and urban development begins there are lessons to be learned from the pacification police.

Chapter 5: Transforming Urban Governance

The prospects for the pacification police cannot be foretold only through the anecdotes of the residents and the police. Their insiders' perspectives are important, but they cannot predict whether the pacification police will be sustainable past the World Cup and the Olympics, whether they will induce reform in the military police, whether they will integrate the informal settlements into the urban fabric, whether they will be an inflection point, or merely a blip, in the intermittent history of police reform and state intervention in these informal, impoverished and unprotected spaces. The pacification police were only recently implemented, and their presence in the informal settlements is ongoing, thus the only conclusions that can be made stem from their possibilities, and as narrated in the previous chapters on the residents' changing views of the police and the police's changing views of their own role in the informal settlements, there are myriad and divergent opportunities.

The perceptions and possibilities of the pacification police are produced by their context. This context is twofold. On the one hand, it includes the urbanization of poverty and violence in the informal settlements; on the other hand, it includes the ongoing reality of police violence and the incomplete attempts at police reform. Whereas Chapter One overviewed the history of the informal settlements, Chapter Two summarized the more recent past of public security an police reform. The pacification police are an intersection of these two histories – they are both an attempt to bring these unprotected spaces back under the control of the state and an effort to break down the barriers that have long distanced these areas from the rest of the city, namely the violence of the traffickers as well as the brutality of the police. The pacification police are the state on the streets in the informal settlements, but as they come from the same institution that was once the main actor of violence in these communities, there are significant doubts as to whether they are capable of returning security. Although they face myriad obstacles if they are to achieve this objective, Chapter Three points to changing perceptions of the police in the eyes of residents, and Chapter Four emphasizes possibilities that the pacification police are

reforming the military police from within. Reforming the military police is important in connecting the police to the residents of the informal settlements, connecting once unprotected spaces with the rest of the city and connecting the state to its citizens. This last chapter uncovers how the pacification police are having impacts beyond security, because bringing the police to the informal settlements is beginning to address broader experiences of urban governance.

The New *Donos do Morro*?

There are myriad factors that have set the informal settlements apart from the rest of the Rio de Janeiro. From their dearth of urban services to their illegal land tenure to their precarious locations on hillsides, they are distinct from the rest of the city despite their physical proximity within it. While their differences are most visible in terms of infrastructure, they are also underlined politically by their control by *donos do morro*, who arose when the *favelas* were first formed in the early 20th century to provide order and to protect the community from forced removal. The traffickers displaced the *donos* as those who imposed social order, and in exchange lent services in times of suffering, though the residents were compelled by violence to abide by their impositions. The territorial demarcation of power has persisted throughout the history of the *favelas*, with their domination by *donos* or *traficantes* yet another distinction separating them from the city. The persistence of territorial control underlines one of the many challenges of the pacification police – not only ensuring their permanence, or even extending infrastructure to these unprotected spaces, but also deterritorializing them, integrating them, raising their physical realities to the standard of the formal city, while also dissolving the divisive territories that define them, including the so-called territories of the pacification police (Misse 2011).

Although their operations are announced in advance, allowing the traffickers to flee but ensuring that most take place without a shot being fired, the strategy of the pacification police is one of territorial occupation, saturating the site with police, searching the residents, establishing rules. Past community policing experiences

were tainted by corruption, thus the control over territory is essential to displace the armed power of the traffickers as well as to deconstruct their symbolic sway over the community. Yet the distinction between security and occupation is blurred when armed police patrols replace those of the traffickers, when they monitor and search who come and go from the community and when they enact rules over the social lives of the residents. The pacification police cannot become yet another occupation by yet other strongmen because more is needed to transform these impoverished communities into neighborhoods integrated with the rest of the city.

These warnings are not intended to deny that the pacification police have not undone the myriad restraints imposed by the traffickers. The residents can come and go without fear of violence, but this freedom is somewhat constrained for those subject to police searches. They can complain to the police about loud music from the *baile funk*, but because the police often decide on the regulations without the consensus of the community they tend to overstep the limits of police authority. The difficulty with their control over territory is that the pacification police border on controlling the everyday lives of the residents, or as one resident said, "it must be a dictatorship if everything has to be approved by the police."[83] For residents used to living under the impositions of the traffickers, several said that they were wary of the police because they no longer knew who was in control. As a community leader argued not against the pacification police but in favor of more dialogue between them and the residents:

> *The pacification police need to understand that what we lived through for many years is completely different from now. They need to invest more in information, they need to explain their motives for restricting the parties, for walking around the community with heavy weaponry, or else it will become like a dictatorship where they say what needs to be done and that is all.*[84]

The residents fear both the police because of their repression as well the return of the traffickers, as so many programs similar to the pacification police stumbled in the past. These fears point to an underlying suspicion that the pacification police are

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[83] Community meeting in Cidade de Deus on July 29, 2011
[84] Discussion with a resident of Cantagalo-Pavão/Pavãozinho on July 5, 2011

only for the World Cup and the Olympics, and that after the world's gaze is no longer on Rio de Janeiro, they will fade away as so many police reform programs have in the past. Yet there is still a sense of hope that the pacification police will be more enduring, especially as their end is inevitably tied to the return of the traffickers. As one resident asked with incredulity, "I think they will stay because they wouldn't do that to us, would they? Imagine what would happen if they left? What would happen to us?"[85] It is as though one type of occupation or another is inescapable; the only source of stability, the only understanding of order, depends on the presence of armed traffickers or the coercive arm of the state. The pacification police are seen in terms of integrating the informal settlements with the city, but even the residents think of the city as something distinct from their community. Even in the most physically proximate communities, where the main road into the *favela* leads to some the most expensive real estate in Rio de Janeiro, there is a distinction made between the city (*a cidade*) and the community (*a comunidade*). This disconnection is deepened by the symbols of the traffickers, from the graffiti marking their control to their ongoing influence over the residents, so that they feel as though they are always being watched. With their occupation of the informal settlements, there is the danger of the pacification police becoming the new *donos do morro*, replacing the traffickers as the ones who establish the rules and provide internal security.[86] Decision-making authority is now vested in the hands of the pacification police. The captain is sought after not only to resolve problems with the police but also to mediate access to government institutions and service providers. Turning to the pacification police is beneficial in terms of enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the community, but it reinforces the perception that the coercive power of the police is the only source of authority outside of the territorial control by the traffickers.

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[85] Discussion with three residents of Prazeres on May 31, 2011
[86] Interview with Silvia Ramos, co-coordinator of the Center for Studies on Security and Citizenship, on July 11, 2011

Nuts and Bolts of Urban Governance Transformation

Looking back over the history of police violence in the informal settlements as well as the persistence of militarism inside the military police, it is important to be cautious about the pacification police, but I will conclude my thesis on a hopeful note. The intended impact of the pacification police is to increase security in the informal settlements where they are operating. What are more interesting are their unintended consequences. The pacification police are reconstructing the identity of the military police, not only in the eyes of residents but also in the minds of police. Their conclusion is far from uncertain, especially as so many precedents of police reform failed to gain political traction, much less support from inside the military police. Yet there is much that makes the pacification police different.

The pacification police are the most widely publicized, broadly implemented public security reform in recent history in Rio de Janeiro. There are currently about 4,000 recruits working in the pacification police, or 10 percent of the total military police corporation. The military police academy is rushing to train more recruits ahead of the World Cup and the Olympics when Rio de Janeiro will be on display for the entire world. There are estimates that the pacification police could total 60,000 in a few years (Barnes 2011). With these numbers there will be more pacification police than conventional military police. This is a significant step forward compared to past programs of police reform that only involved a handful of officers and rarely went beyond more than a few informal settlements. Moreover, their publicity means that rather than focusing only on the informal settlements, the entire city is talking about the pacification police. My anecdotal encounters reveal that much skepticism remains as to whether the pacification police will still be around after the upcoming mega-events. It is impossible to make these kinds of predictions, but it is possible to underline the achievements that the pacification police have already made.

My main argument is that the pacification police are possibly transforming the understanding and experience of urban governance in Rio de Janeiro. At least they have the potential to fulfill this unintended mission with support from public authorities. They are doing so directly by undoing the metaphors of war that once

mediated relations between the military police and the residents of the informal settlements. They are also doing so indirectly as the state on the streets where they are operating. The pacification police are symbolically transforming how the state interacts with the urban poor by physically reconnecting the informal settlements with the city, enhancing public accountability to serving these communities and broadening the state's legitimacy in these once unprotected spaces.

The pacification police are making the state more physically present in the informal settlements. My attendance at community meetings and my discussions with residents reveal that what they want is not a police occupation but a social invasion. When I asked a community leader what her community needed that the pacification police could not provide, she replied, "Everything; basic infrastructure to live. We want maintenance by the public authorities. The police are about force and enforcement. The social aspect is not part of their culture."[87] The residents are hopeful that with the pacification police that more investment in infrastructure and social services will be extended to their communities. Urbanizing and upgrading the informal settlements has been a struggle from long before the pacification police, something that goes far beyond the mandate of the police. There are several service providers that are collaborating with the pacification police to enter the informal settlements (and enroll new customers). Others are more intransigent, but they are facing increasing demands from the residents who remind them that they no longer have the excuse of insecurity for not serving their communities.

The pacification police are also making the state more accountable. There is still police repression, even several *autos de resistência*, or police killings supposedly for resisting arrest. It cannot be argued that the pacification police have broken with their militarized training but they are part of a transition in how policing is done in the informal settlements. The very fact that residents can confront the captain with stories of police abuse is already an achievement compared to the very recent past when there was almost no recourse against police violence. Two pacification police captains have already been removed for corruption with the traffickers, underlining

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[87] Interview with a community leader in Fallet-Fogueteiro-Coroa on May 27, 2011

the temptations of collusion but emphasizing the efforts that the pacification police are making to punish corruption when before it was mostly overlooked. Enhancing accountability also means making the state more responsive to its citizens. The very presence of the pacification police puts pressure on all levels of the state – from politicians to public service providers – to pay more attention to spaces that once were thought about mainly in terms of insecurity, especially as the city wants to show that much is being done in anticipation of the World Cup and the Olympics.

The shadow of the upcoming mega-events holds sway over the pacification police. Their full rollout across the most visible parts of the city – where the tourists flock, where the private sector flourishes, where the athletes and their fans will congregate in a few years time – is timed to coincide with the World Cup, when the final game will be played in the famous Maracanã Stadium in Rio de Janeiro in 2014. In a country that takes its *futebol* very seriously the importance of this moment cannot be overstated. Their connection to the mega-events is often a criticism of the pacification police, but I wonder if this could also be an opportune time to make more lasting changes to public security specifically and to urban governance more broadly. With its economic resurgence and its prominent role on the diplomatic stage there is much attention focused on Brazil's postcard city. The private sector is migrating from the metropolis of São Paulo to the beauty of Rio de Janeiro (Economist 2011). The pacification police are part of a program to position Rio de Janeiro, long tarnished by its reputation for violence, as a city for local, national and international investment. Brazil's richest businessman is contributing R$20 million annually to support the pacification police. The pacification police are making Rio de Janeiro a safer city for capital, but are there possibilities that the urban informal poor could benefit from these opportunities?

To accomplish its official objective of pacifying the informal settlements, one of the unofficial outcomes of the pacification police is the beginning of a pacification of the military police. A city safe for capital is not one where armed criminals control almost all of the more than one thousand informal settlements where about one-fourth of the population resides. Nor is a safe city one where statistics of police violence are among the highest in the world. Almost inadvertently in attempting to

make the city safer for capital the pacification police are simultaneously fostering different possibilities of urban governance for the urban poor. A transformation in urban governance means enhancing the legitimacy of the state in the informal settlements where its presence has long been distant, if not deeply complicit in the violence within them. More than revealing only its coercive presence with the armed invasions of the military police or the intermittent efforts at urban upgrading, the pacification police are strengthening the infrastructural power of the state. The transition from militarized to community policing is also part of a broader transformation from a state that was once distant in terms of infrastructure and complicit in terms of violence but is moving towards more direct engagement with the urban informal poor who have been only indirectly, if not outside, the realm of its governance. The pacification police are making this happen by connecting the state to the informal settlements.

Conclusion

Where once democratization confronted many developing countries, much of the current discourse debates the institutional character of developmental states. Despite the consolidation of political democracy, there remain questions as to the responsiveness of democracies to the economic and social rights of its citizens. The developing state has been transformed, but in the language of development, has the state "become closer to the people?" (Heller 2001, 132) Brazil is often portrayed as a laboratory of democratic reform and inclusive governance, where civil society pressured an authoritarian regime into democratizing, where a city government began an experiment in participatory budgeting that was translated to the national and international scales, where a national government consolidated social programs that contributed to one of the sharpest declines in poverty in a history of having the world's highest levels of inequality (Houtzager 2010; Santos 1998; Ferreira 2010). Yet there are questions as to broader understandings and experiences of democratic governance.

This is especially true in the informal settlements, where ambiguous tenure begets artisanal construction, where inadequate infrastructure necessitates informal provision, where informality intersects with insecurity which stems from the inability and/or unwillingness of the state to confront the reality of its urban informal poor. The *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro are the subject of fascination and scorn; they are from where much of the city's allure originates yet where most of its fears are concentrated (Baiocchi 2001, 143). Yet the urbanization of poverty is more than the production of informality but the transformation of urban governance. Notwithstanding their poverty, nor overlooking their insecurity, the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro are where urban governance is evolving, where the longstanding absence of the state once termed them ungoverned spaces, but where urban governance with the pacification police is transforming.

The pacification police are a step towards transforming urban governance across Rio de Janeiro. This is most obvious in the realm of security but their impact reverberates beyond reductions in violence in and around the informal settlements. The pacification police are a step towards fostering inclusion in a city long divided, with the police as intermediaries between a state that has long been distant and the urban poor who have long been excluded. Cynicism says that the pacification police will not last beyond the Olympics, but with the eyes of the world on Rio de Janeiro it is hopeful that a temporary security fix will translate into a permanent governance approach. The pacification police are already transforming the ways that the urban poor experience the police, and with the police the most visible presence of the state on the streets, they are potentially transforming how the residents of the informal settlements interact with the state. These impacts are both narrow and profound, limited in the sense that only a few of the more than one thousand *favelas* across the metropolitan area will benefit from the pacification police, but extensive in the sense that this example provides insight into a way forward in the inclusion of the urban poor in the urbanization of their communities and the integration of the informal settlements into the urban fabric of the city.

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